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Russian Efforts Against Election In frastructure
I. (U) INTRODUCTION
(U) From 2017 to 2019, the Committee held hearings, conducted interviews, and
reviewed intelligence related to Russian attempts in 2016 to access election infrastructure. The
Committee sought to determine the extent of Russian activities, identify the response of the U.S.
Government at the state, local, and federal level to the threat, and make recommendations on
how to better prepare for such threats in the future. 1 he Committee received testimony from
state election officials, Obama administration officials, and those in the Intelligence Community
and elsewhere in the U.S. Government responsible for evaluating threats to elections.
II. (U) FINDINGS
U  The Russian govemment directed extensive activity, beginning in at least 2014
and carrying into at least 2017, against U.S. election infrastructure' at the state and local
level.
The Committee has seen no evidence that any votes were
changed or that any voting machines were manipulated.^
2.
' (U) The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) defines election infrastructure as "storage facilities, polling
places, and centralized vote tabulation locations used to support the election process, and information and
communications technology to include voter registration databases, voting machines, and other systems to manage
the election process and report and display results on behalf of state and local governments, " according to the
January 6, 2017 statement issued by Secretary of Homeland Security Jeh Johnson on the Designation of Election
Infrastructure as a Critical Infrastructure Subsector, available at https://www.dhs.gov/news/2017/10/06/statement-
secretary-johnson-designation-election-infrastructure-crilical. Similarly, the Help America Vote Act (HAVA), Pub.
L. No. 107-252, Section 301(b)( 1) refers to a functionally similar set of equipment as "voting systems," although the
definition excludes physical polling places themselves, among other differences, 52 U.S.C. §21081 (b). This report
uses the term election infrastructure broadly, to refer to the equipment, processes, and systems related to voting,
tabulating, reporting, and registration.
The Committee has reviewed the intelligence reporting underlying the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) assessment from early 2017
■I I I The Committee finds it credible.(U) The names of the states the Committe^poKH^iav^eer^^laced with numbers. DHS and some slates
asked the Committee to protect state names before providing the Committee with information. The Committee's
goal was to get the most information possible, so state names are anonymized throughout this report. Where the
report refers to public testimony by Illinois state election officials, that state is identified.
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3. (U) While the Committee does not know with confidence what Moscow's intentions
were, Russia may have been probing vulnerabilities in voting systems to exploit later.
Alternatively, Moscow may have sought to undermine confidence in the 2016 U.S.
elections simply through the discovery of their activity.
4. (U) Russian efforts exploited the seams between federal authorities and capabilities, and
protections for the states. The U.S. intelligence apparatus is, by design, foreign-facing,
with limited domestic cybersccurity authorities except where the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) can work with state
and local partners. State election officials, who have primacy in running elections, were
not sufficiently warned or prepared to handle an attack from a hostile nation-state actor.
5. (U) DHS and FBI alerted states to the threat of cyber attacks in the late summer and fall
of 2016, but the warnings did not provide enough information or go to the right people.
Alerts were actionable, in that they provided malicious Internet Protocol (IP) addresses to
information technology (IT) professionals, but they provided no clear reason for states to
take this threat more seriously than any other alert received.
6. (U) In 2016, officials at all levels of government debated whether publicly
acknowledging this foreign activity was the right course. Some were deeply concerned
that public warnings might promote the very impression they were trying to dispel—that
the voting systems were insecure.
7. (U) Russian activities demand renewed attention to vulnerabilities in U.S. voting
infrastructure. In 2016, cybersecurity for electoral infrastructure at the state and local
level was sorely lacking; for example, voter registration databases were not as secure as
they could have been. Aging voting equipment, particularly voting machines that had no
paper record of votes, were vulnerable to exploitation by a committed adversary. Despite
the focus on this issue since 2016, some of these vulnerabilities remain.
8. (U) In the face of this threat and these security gaps, DHS has redoubled its efforts to
build trust with states and deploy resources to assist in securing elections. Since 2016,
DHS has made great strides in learning how election procedures vary across states and
how federal entities can be of most help to states. The U.S. Election Assistance
Commission (EAC), the National Association of Secretaries of State (NASS), the
National Association of State Election Directors (NASED), and other groups have helped
DHS in this effort. DHS's work to bolster states' cybersecurity has likely been effective,
in particular for those states that have leveraged DI IS's cybeisecurily assessments for
election infrastructure, but much more needs to be done to coordinate state, local, and
federal knowledge and efforts in order to harden states' electoral infrastructure against
foreign meddling.
9. (U) To assist in addressing these vulnerabilities, Congress in 2018 appropriated $380
million in grant money for the states to bolster cybersecurity and replace vulnerable
4
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voting machines/ When those funds are spent. Congress should evaluate the results and
consider an additional appropriation to address remaining insecure voting machines and
systems.
10. (U) DHS and other federal government entities remain respectful of the limits of federal
involvement in state election systems. States should be firmly in the lead for running
elections. The country's decentralized election system can be a strength from a
cybersecurity perspective, but each operator should be keenly aware of the limitations of
their cybersecurity capabilities and know how to quickly and properly obtain assistance.
III. (U) THE ARC OF RUSSIAN ACTIVITIES
In its review of the 2016 elections, the Committee found no evidence that vote
tallies were altered or that voter registry files were deleted or modified, though the Committee
and IC's insight into this is limited. Russian government-affiliated cyber actors conducted an
unprecederit£dJeycl_ofjictm state election infrastructure in the run-up to the 2016 U.S.
elections^
Throughout 2016 and for several years before, Russian intelligence
services and government personnel conducted a number of intelligence-related activities
targeting the voting process.
the Committee found ample evidence to suggest
that the Russian government was developing and implementing capabilities to interfere in the
2016 elections, including undermining confidence in U.S. democratic institutions and voting
processes.^
^ (U) Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-141, 132 Stat. 348, 561-562.
' (U) The Committee has limited information on the extent to which state and local election authorities carried out
forensic evaluation of registration databases. These activities are routinely carried out in the context of private sector
breaches.
FBI LHM.I
Ifbi LHM,
DHS Homeland (ntelligence Briel
FBI LHM,
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Evidence of scanning of state election systems first appeared in the summer
prior to the 2016 election. In mid-July 2016, Illinois discovered anomalous network activity,
specifically a large increase in outbound data, on a Illinois Board of Elections' voter registry
website.'" Working with Illinois, the FBI commenced an investigation.'
the voter registration database.
The attack resulted in data exfiitration from
(U) On Augu^lS, 2016, FBI issued an unclassified FLASH'^ to state technical-level
experts on a set of^m^ identified from the attack on lilinois's voter
registration databases.
product did not aitribute the attack to Russia or any otherpaScuIa^cto^
The FLASH
FBI Electronic C('mnninicaiion.
(U) DHS briefing for SSCi staff, March 5, 2018.
'/ (U) SSCI Transcript of the Open Hearing on Russian Interference in the 2016 U.S. Elections, held on Wednesday,
June 21. 2017, p. 1 13.
IS a
) According to the United States Computer Emergency Readiness Team (US-CERT), an SQL injection
echnique that attempts to subvert the relationship oetween a webpage and its supporting database,
typically in order to trick the database into executing malicious code."
(U) DHS IIR 4 0050006 17, An IP Address Targeted Multiple U.S. Slate Government's to Include Election
Syfttpms October 4, 2016
'Hi ) DHS briefing for SSCI staff, March 5,2018.
J  (U) FBI FLASH alerts are notifications of potential cyber threats sent to local law enforcement and private
industry so that administrators are able to guard their systems against the described threat. FLASHs marked TLP:
AMBER are considered sharable with members of the recipients own organization and those with direct need to
know.
lumber T-LD1004-TT, TLP-AMBER,
(U) Ibid.
(U) Ibid
wned
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After the issuance of the August FLASH, the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) and the Multi-State-Information Sharing & Analysis Center (MS-ISAC)-- asked
states to review their log files to determine if the IP addresses described in the FLASH had
touched their infrastructure. This request for voluntary self-reporting, in conjunction with DHS
analysis of NetFlow activity on MS-ISAC internet sensors, identified another 20 states whose
networks had made connections to at least one IP address listed on the FLASH. DHS was
almost entirely reliant on states to self-report scanning activity.
Former Special Assistant to
the President and Cybersecurity Coordinator Michael Daniel said, "eventually we get enough of
a picture that we become confident over the course of August of 2016 that we're seeing the
Russians probe a whole bunch of different state election infrastructure, voter registration
databases, and other related infrastructure on a regular basis."-^ Dr. Samuel Liles, Acting
Director of the Cyber Analysis Division within DHS's Office of Intelligence and Analysis
(I&A), testified to the Committee on June 21, 2017, that "by late September, we determined that
internet-connected election-related networks in 21 states were potentially targeted by Russian
government cyber actors."-^
" (I') Hie MS-ISAC is a DHS-suppei tcd grinip dedieuied lo sharing information between state, local, tribal, and
territorial (SLTT) government entities, it serves as the central cybersecurity resource for SLTT governments.
Entities join to receive cybersecurity advisories and alerts, vulnerability assessments, incident response assistance,
and other services.
DHS IIR 4 005 0006, An IP Address Targeted Multiple U.S. Stale Governments to Include Election
^ys/emT^^ber 4, 2016; DHS briefing for SSCl staff, March 5,2018.
(U) SSCl Transcript of the Interview with John Brennan, Former Director, CIA, held on Friday, June 23, 2017, p.
41.
(U) SSCl Transcript of the Interview with Michael Daniel, Former Special Assistant to the President and
Cybersecurity Coordinator, National Security Council, held on August 31, 2017, p. 39.
(LI) SSCl Transcript of the Open Hearing on Russian Interference in the 2016 U.S. Elections, held on Wednesday,
June21,2017,p. 12.
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fU^H^jn^BI issued a second FI ASH and a Joint Analysis Report in October that
flagged suspect IP addresses, many unrelated to Russia.-"' DHS briefers told the
Committee that they were intentionally over-reporting out of an abundance of caution, given
their concern about the seriousness of the threat. DHS representatives told the Committee, "We
were very much at that point in a sort of duty-to-warn type of attitude ... where maybe a specific
incident like this, which was unattributed at the time, wouldn't have necessarily risen to that
level. But... we were seeing concurrent targeting of other election-related and political figures
and political institutions ... [which] led to what would probably be more sharing than we would
normally think to do."~^
DHS assessed that the searches, done alphabetically, probably
included all 50 states, and consisted of research on "general election-related web pages, voter ID
information, election system software, and election service companies."^'
FBI FI.ASH. Alert NiimherT-l.ni005-TT. TLP-AMBER,|
I; DHS/FBl JAR-16-20223, Threats to Federal.
Shiie. tiiul l.ocdl (.iovcnunL'iu (X'tobcr 14,2016.
^^(U)SSCl interview with DHS and CTIIC. February 27. 2018. p. 9-10.
FBI LHM.I
DI IS Hotnekind Intclliiicnce Brief.
^^^HNSA^^^^^^^^HDIRNSA^^a^^O 17. This information was not available to theNSA|
U.S. governinont iitiiil April 2017
3 ^
(U)NS DIRNSA. May5,2017.
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The
Russian Embassy placed a formal request to observe the cicclions witfuheDepartm^t of State,
but also reached outside diplomatic channels in an attempt to secure permission directly from
state and local election officials. " In objecting to these tactics, then-Assistant Secretary of State
for European and Eurasian Affairs Victoria Nuland reminded the Russian Ambassador that
Russia had refused invitations to participate in the official OSCE mission that was to observe
the U.S. elections.^^
FBI IIR" (U)FB1IIR|
(U) Ibid.
i^^(LI) DTS 2018-2152, SSCI Interview with Andrew McCabe, Former Deputy Director of the FBI, February 14
20^ pp. 221-222.
Email, sent November 4, 2016; from^^^^^H: to:|
Subject: Kislyak Protest of FBI Tactics
DIRNSA, May s! 2017.^Mt)NSA
^Uin/hUL
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(U) The Committee found no evidence of Russian artors attempting to manipulate vote
tallies on Election Day, though again the Commillee and IC's insight into this is limited.
In the years since the 2016 election, awareness of the threat, activity by DHS, and
measures at the state and local level to better secure election infrastructure have all shown
considerable improvement. The threat, however, remains imperfectly understood. In a briefing
before Senators on August 22, 2018, DNI Daniel Coats, FBI Director Christopher Wray, then-
DHS Secretary Kirstjen Nielsen, and then-DHS Undersecretary for the National Protection and
Programs Division Christopher Krebs told Senators that there were no known threats to election
infrastructure. However, Mr. Krebs also said that top election vulnerabilities remain, including
the administration of the voter databases and the tabulation of the data, with the latter being a
much more difficult target to attack."^" Relatedly, several weeks prior to the 2018 mid-term
election, DHS assessed that "numerous actors are regularly targeting election infrastructure,
likely for different purposes, including to cause disruptive effects, steal sensitive data, and
undermine confidence in the election.'"'''
IV. (U) ELEMENTS OF RUSSIAN ACTIVITIES
A. (U) Targeting Activity
Scanning of election-related state infrastructure by Moscow was the most
widespread activity the IC and DHS elements observed in the run up to the 2016 election.'"'
111^^ In an interview with the Committee, Mr. Daniel stated: "What it mostly looked
like to us was reconnaissance.... I would have characterized it at the time as sort of
conducting the reconnaissance to do the network mapping, to do the topology mapping so
(IJ)^^^ 2018-3275, Summary of 8/22/2018 All Senators Election Security Briefing, August 28.20)8.
Homeland Security intelligence Assessment: Cyber Actors Continue to Engage in Influence
Activities and Targeting of Election Infrastructure, October 11,2018.
^ (U) DTS 2019-1368, NIC 2019-01, Intelligence Community Assessment: A Summary of the Intelligence
Community Report on Foreign Interference as Directed by Executive Order 13848, March 29, 2019. p. 2-3.
(U) Ibid.
(U) SSCI interview of representatives from DHS and CTIIC, February 27,2018, p. 12.
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that you could actually understand the network, establish a presence so you could come
back later and actually execute an operation.'"''^
(U) Testifying before the Committee, Dr. Liles characterized the activity as "simple
scanning for vulnerabilities, analogous to somebody walking down the street and looking
to see if you are home. A small number of systems were unsuccessfully exploited, as
though somebody had rattled the doorknob but was unable to get in .. . [however] a small
number of the networks were successfully exploited. They made it through the door."^^
DHS and FBI assessments on the number of affected states evolved since
In ajoinl FBl/DHS intelligence product published in March 2018, and coordinated with
the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), the Department
of State, the National Intelligence Council, the National Security Agency (NSA), and the
Department of Treasury, DHS and FBI assessed that Russian inteiliaence
services conducted activit>
2016.
DHS arrived at their initial assessment by evaluating whether the tactics,
techniques, and procedures (TTPs) observed were consistent with previously observed
Russian TTPs, whether the actors used known Russian-affiliated malicious infrastructure,
and whether a state or local election system was the target.
(U) The majority of information examined by DHS was provided by the states
themselves. The MS-ISAC gathered information from states that noticed the suspect IPs
pinging their systems. In addition, FBI was working with some states in local field
offices and reporting back FBI's findings.
(U) If some slates evaluated their logs incompletely or inaccurately, then DHS might
have no indieation of whether they were scanned or attacked. As former-Homeland
Security Adviser Lisa Monaco told the Committee, "Of course, the law enforcement and
the Intelligence community is going to be significantly reliant on what the holders and
'•'(U) SSCI Transcript of the Interview of Michael Daniel. Former A.ssistant to the President and Cybersecurity
Coordinator, National Security Council, August 31, 2017, p. 44.
(U) SSCI Transcript of the Open Hearing on Russian Interference in the 2016 U.S. Elections, held on Wednesday,
June 21. 2017. p. 13.
DHS FBI Homeland Intelligence Brief.
(Li) See chart, infra, tor information on successful breaches.
(U) DHS did not count attacks on political parties, political organizations, or NGOs. For example, the compromise
of an email affiliated with a partisan State 13 voter registration organization was not included in DHS's count.
11
COMMITTEE SENSITIVE - RUSSIA INVESTIGATION ONLY
COMMI I THH SENSITIVE - RUSSIA INVESTIGATION ONLY
owners and operators of the infrastructure sees on its system [sic] and dooidcs to raisL
their hand."^"^
However, both tjig^IC and the Committee in its own review were unable to
the states,
(U) Mr. Daniel told the Committee that by late August 2016, he had already personally
concluded that the Russians had attempted to intrude in all 50 states, based on the extent of the
activity and the apparent randomness of the attempts. "My professional judgment was we have
to work under the assumption that they've tried to go everywhere, because they're thorough,
they're competent, they're good."^^
Intelligence developed later in 2018 bolstered Mr. Daniel's assessment
that all 50 states were targeted.
(U) SSCI Transcript of the Interview with of Lisa Monaco, Former Homeland Security Advisor, August 10, 2017,
p. 38.
" (U) SSCI Transcript of the Interview with Michael Daniel, Former Assistant to the President and Cybersecurity
Coorditiaior, National Security Council, August 31, 2017, p. 40.
[DllS I BI Homeland intelligence Bulletin,!
'• (IJ) Ibi^
(L) DHS briefing for SSCI staff, March 5, 2018.
(li) SSCI interview of representatives from DHS and CTIIC, February 27,2018, pp. 11-12.
(U) DHS briefing for SSCI staff, March 5,2018.
12
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(U) However, IP addresses associated with the August 18, 2016 FLASH provided some
indications the activity might be attributable to the Russian government, particularly the GRU:
One of the Netherlands-based I
"exhibited the same behavior from the same node over a period of lime. ... It was
behaving like ... the same user or group of users was using this to direct activity against
the same type of targets," according to DHS staff.^^
(U) Ibid.
" (U) Ibid.
" (U) Ibid,
"^'^'^ibid.
FR R
" (L)) Cyber Threat Intelligence Integration Center (CTIIC) Cyber Threat Intelligence Summary, October 7, 2016.
" (U) Ibid.
(t) SSCl interview of representatives from DHS and CTIIC, February 27,2018, p. 13.
13
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The IC's confidence level aboul the attribution oflhe attacks evolved over
2017 and into 2018
The Committee reached out to the 21 states that DHS first identified as targets of
scanning activity to leam about their experiences. Election officials provided the Committee
(U) DHS Electronic Communication, December 19. 2016, email from: DHS/NCCIC: to: CIA.
7(
DHS Intelligence Assessment, Hostile Russian Cyber Targeting ofElcciion Infrasiniciure in 2016:
Probable Non-Stale Actors Attempt Disruption, May 3, 2017.
(II) Ibid.(E^SCI interview of representatives from DHS and CTIIC, February 27, 2018, p. 13.
DHS arrived at their initial assessment of 21 states affected by adding the eleven plus seven states, plus
the three where scanning activity appeared directed at less specifically election-focused infrastructure.
(U) SSCl conference call with DHS and FBI, March 29, 2018.
14
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details about the activity they saw on their networks, and the Committee compared that
acLuunling to UHS's reporting of eveiils.^'^ Where those accounts differed is noted below. The
scanning activity took place from approximately June through September 2016.
STATE OBSERVED ACTIVITY^
Illinois
(U) See infra. "Russian Access to Election-Related Infrastructure" for a
detailed description.
State 2
(U) See infra. "Russian Access to Election-Related Infrastructure" for a
detailed description.
State 3
(U) According to State 3 officials, cyber actors using infrastructure identified in
the August FLASH conducted scanning activity.^® State 3 officials noticed
"abnormal behavior" and took action to block the related IP addres.ses.^'
m DHS reported GRU scanning attempts against two separate domains
related to election infrastructure.
State 4 (U) See infra, "Two Unexplained Events" for a detailed description.
State 5
(U) Cyber actors using infrastructure identified in the August FLASH scanned
"an old website and non-relevant archives," according to the State 5 Secretary
of State's office.^^ The following day, State 5 took action to block the IP
address.
DHS, however, reported GRU scanning activity on two separate State
5 Secretary of State websites, plus targeting of a District Attorney's office^^ in a
particular city.^'' Both the websites appear to be current addresses for the State
5 Secretary of State's office.
State 6
(U) According to State 6 officials, cyber actors using infrastructure identified in
the August FLASH scanned^' the entire state IT infrastructure, including by
using the Acunetix tool, but the "affected systems" were the Secretary of State's
(U) DHS briefed Committee staff three times on the attacks, and staff reviewed hundreds of pages of intelligence
assessments.
(U) Slight variation between what states and DHS reported to the Committee Is an indication of one of the
challenges in election cybersecurity. The system owners—in this case, state and local administrators—are in the
best position to carry out comprehensive cyber reviews, but they often lack the expertise or resources to do so. The
federal government has resources and expertise, but the IC can see only limited information about inbound attacks
because of legal restrictions on operations inside the United States.
(U) Memorandum for the Record, SSCI Staff, Conference Call with [State 3], December 8,2017.
(U) Ibid
(U) DHS briefing for Committee staff on March 5,2018.
(U) Memorandum for the Record, SSCI Staff, Conference Call with [State 5], December 1,2017.
" (U) Ibid
(f'flU) Briefers suggested the "most wanted" list housed on the District Attorney's website may have in
some way been connected to voter registration. The exact nature of this connection, including whether it was a
technical network connection or whether databases of individuals with felony convictions held by the District
Attorney's office had voting registration implications, is unclear.
(U) DHS briefing for Committee slalT on March 5, 2018.
(U) State 6 officials did not specify, but in light of the DHS assessment, they likely meant SQL injection.
15
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web application and the election results wcbsitc.^^ If the penclialiun liad been
successful, actors could have manipulated the unofficial display of the election
tallies.'^'^ State officials believed they would have caught any inconsistency
quickly.*^'^ State 6 became aware of this malicious activity and alerted
partners.^'
DHS reported that GRU actors scanned State 6, then unsuccessfully
attempted many SQL injection attacks. State 6 saw the highest number of SQL
attempts of any state.
State 7
(U) According to State 7 officials, cyber actors using infrastructure identified in
the August FLASH scanned public-facing websites, including the "static"
election site.^- It seemed the actors were "cataloging holes to come back later,"
according to state election offlcials.^^ State 7 became aware of this malicious
activity after receiving an FBI alert.
DHS reported GRU scanning attempts against two separate domains
related to election infrastructure.^"'
State 8
(U) According to State 8 officials, cyber actors using infrastructure identified in
the August FLASH scanned a State 8 public election website on one day.^^
State 8 officials described the activity as heightened but not particularly out of
the ordinary. State 8 became aware of this malicious activity afiter receiving
an alert.
u k
State 9
(U) According to State 9 officials, cyber actors using infrastructure identified in
an October MS-ISAC advisory'^' scanned the statewide voter registration
(U) Memorandum for the Record, SSCI Staff, Conference Call with [State 6], November 17,2017.
(U) Ibid
^ (U) Ibid
" (U) Ibid
(U) Memorandum for the Record, SSCI Staff, Conference Call with [State 7], January 25,2018.
(U) Ibid
^ (U) Ibid
(U) DHS briefing for Committee staff on March 5,2018.
(U) Memorandum for the Record, SSCI Staff, Conference Call with [State 8], February 2,2018.
(U) Ibid
(U) Ibid
(U) DHS briefing for Committee staff on March 5,2018.
(U) Ibid
(IJ) While the Committee was unable to review the specific indicators shared with State 9 by the MS-ISAC in
October, the Committee believes at least one of the relevant IPs was originally named in the August FLASH because
of technical data held by DHS which was briefed to the Committee.
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State 10
sysTem. Officials used the analogy of a thief casing a parking lot: they said
the car thief "didn't go in, but we don't know why.""^^ State 9 became aware of
this malicious activity after receiving an alert.
DHS reported GRU scanning activity on the Secretary of State
domain.
(U) According to Stale 10 officials, cyber actors using infrastructure identified
in the August FLASH conducted activity that was "very loud," with a three-
pronged attack: a Netherlands-based IP address attempted SQL injection on all
fields 1,500 times, a U.S.-based IP address attempted SQL injection on several
fields, and a Poland-based IP address attempted SQL injection on one field 6-7
times. State 10 received relevant cybersecurity indictors from MS-ISAC in
early August, around the same time that the attacks occurred. State lO's IT
contractor attributed the attack to Russia and suggested that the activity was
reminiscent of other attacks where attackers distract with lots of noise and then
"sneak in the back.""^^
(U) State 10, through its firewall, blocked attempted malicious activity against
the online voter registration system and provided logs to the National
Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center (NCCIC)'"'^ and the U.S.
Computer Emergency Readiness Team (US-CERT).'"' State 10 also brought in
an outside contractor to assist.' '
DHS confirmed GRU SQL injection attempts against State lO's voter
services website on August 5 and said that the attack was blocked after one day
by State lO's firewall.
State
(U) According to State 11 officials, they have seen no evidence of scanning or
attack attempts related to election infrastructure in 2016."^ While State 11
officials noted an IP address "probing" state systems, activity which was
"broader than state election systems," State 11 election officials did not provide
specifics on which systems."''
'"2 (U) Memorandum for the Record, SSCI Staff, Conference Call with [State 9], November 17, 2017.
(U) Ibid.
(L) Ibid
(I)) DHS briefing for Committee staff on March 5, 2018.
'"^(U) Memorandum for the Record, SSCI Staff, Conference Call with [State 10], November 29, 2017.
(U) Ibid
(U) Ibid
(II) NCCIC is DHS's cyber watch center.
^'°(li)Ibid
'  (U) DHS briefing for Committee staff on March 5,2018.
(U) Memorandum for the Record, SSCI Staff, Conference Call vdth [State 11], December 8,2017.
^'*iV)Ibid.
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DHS reported GRU scanning activity on the Secretary of State
domain.'
State 12
(U) Cyber actors using infrastructure identified in the August FLASH
conducted scanning activity that "lasted less than a second and no security
breach occurred," according to State 12 officials."^ State 12 became aware of
this malicious activity after being alerted to it.
DHS reported that because of a lack of sensor data related to this
incident, they relied on NetPIow data, which provided less granular
information."^ DHS's only clear indication of GRU scanning on State I2's
Secretary of State website came from State 12 self-reporting information to MS-
ISAC after the issuance of the August FLASH notification."*^
State 13
(U) According to State 13 officials, they have seen no evidence of scanning or
attack attempts related to state-wide election infrastructure in 2016.'-"
State 14
IP address used by the GRU at the time and the State 14 election commission
webpage, but no indication of a compromise. In addition, DHS was
informed of activity relating to separate IP addresses in the August FLASH,
(U) DHS briefing for Committee staff on March 5, 2018.
'  (U) Memorandum for the Record, SSCI Staff, Conference Call with [State 12], December 1,2017.
' (U) DHS briefing for Committee staff on March 5, 2018.
(U) Memorandun^Mh^ecord, SSCI Staff, Conference Call with [State 13], December 1,2017.
(U) FBI DHS briefing for Committee staff on March 5. 2018.
122
1; DHS briefing for Committee
staff on March 5,2018. For more information on decisions by DHS to exclude certain activity in its count of 21
states, vt'c tcxl box, infra, "DHS Methodology for Identifying States Touched by Russian Cyber Actors."
DHS'FBI Homeland Intelligence Brief.]
[; DHS briefing for Committee staff on March 5, 2018.
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including attempted Domain Name System (DNS) lookups and potentially
malicious emails, some dating back to January 2016.'-'*
State 15
(U) State 15 officials were not aware that the state was among those targeted
until they were notified.'-^ State 15's current lead election official was not in
place during the 2016 election so they had little insight into any scanning or
attempted intrusion on their systems. State 15 officials said that generally they
viewed 2016 as a success story because the attempted infiltration never got past
the state's four layers of security.
DHS reported broad GRU scanning activity on State 15 government
domains.
State 16
(U) According to State 16 officials, cyber actors using lnfra,structure identified
in the October FLASH conducted scanning activity against a state government
network.'-^
^^^^DHS reported information on GRU scanning activity based on a self-
report from State 16 after the issuance of the October FLASH.
State 17
(U) State 17 officials reported nothing "irregular, inconsistent, or suspicious"
leading up to the election.'-^ While State 17 IT staff received an MS-ISAC
notification, that notification was not shared within the state government.
DHS reported GRU scanning activitv on an elecrinn-related domain
State 18
(U) State 18 election officials said they observed no connection from the IP
addresses listed in the election-related notifications.'^-
DHS reported indications of GRU scanning activity on a State 18
government domain.
State 19
(U) According to State 19 officials, cyber actors using infrastructure identified
in October by MS-ISAC conducted scanning activity. State 19 claimed this
activity was "blocked," but did not elaborate on why or how it was blocked.'^'*
DES IIR 4 019 0012 17, Cyber Activity Targeting [State 14] Government Networks from Internet
Protocol Addresses Associated with Targeting State Elections Systems, October 21,2016.
(U) Memorandum for the Record, SSCI Staff, Conference Call with [State 15], March 12,2018.
(U) DHS briefing for Committee staff on March 5, 2018.
'2'(LI) Memorandum for the Record, SSCI Staff, Conference Call with [State 16], December 1,2017.
(U) DHS briefing for Committee staff on March 5, 2018.
'^'(U) Memorandum for the Record, SSCI Staff, Conference Call with [State 17], January 25, 2018.
(U)/A/V.
(U) DHS briefing for Committee staff on March 5,2018.
(II) Memorandum for the Record, SSCI Staff, Conference Call with [State 18], December 8,2017.
(U) DHS briefing for Committee staff on March 5,2018.
(U) Memorandum for the Record, SSCI Staff, Conference Call with [State 19], December 1,2017.
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Di IS reported indications of GRU scanning activity on two separate
State 19 government domains.
State 20
(U) According to State 20 officials, cyber actors using infrastructure identified
in October by MS-ISAC were "knocking" on the state's network, but no
successful intrusion occurred.
1^^^ DHS reported GRU scanning activity on the Secretary of State
domain.
State 21
(U) State 21 officials received indicators from MS-ISAC in October 2016.
They said they were not aware the state was among those targeted until
notified.
DHS reported GRU scanning activity on an election-related domain as
well as at least one other government system connected to the voter registration
system.
Neither DHS nor the Committee can ascertain a pattern to the states targeted,
lending credence to DHS's later assessment that all 50 states probably were scanned. DHS
representatives told the Committee that "there wasn't a clear red state-blue state-purple state,
more electoral votes, less electoral votes" pattern to the attacks. DHS acknowledged that the
U.S. Government does not have perfect insight, and it is possible the IC missed some activity or
that slates did not notice intrusion attemi 40themortor re
(U) DHS briefing for Committee staff on March 5, 2018.
(U) Memorandum for the Record, SSCI Staff, Conference Call with [State 20], November 17,2017.
(U) DHS briefing for Committee staff on March 5,2018.
Memorandum for the Record, SSCI Staff, Conference Call with [State 21], November 17,2017.
(U) DHS briefing for Committee staff on March 5, 2018.
''"'(U) SSCI interview uiih DI IS and CTIIC. Februarv 27. 2018. p. 25.
(L)) SSCI interview witli DHS and CTilC, February 27, 2018, p. 21.
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looking for evidence of threats to
election An October 2018 DHS
Intelligence Assessment reported the following:
We judge that numerous actors are regularly targeting election infrastructure,
likelyfor different purposes, including to cause disruptive effects, steal sensitive
data, and undermine confidence in the election. We are aware ofa growing
volume ofmalicious activity targeting election infrastructure in 2018, although
we do not have a complete baseline of prior years to determine relative scale of
the activity. Much ofour understanding ofcyber threats to election infrastructure
is due to proactive sharing by state and local election officials, as well as more
robust intelligence and information sharing relationships amongst the election
community and within the Department. The observed activity has leveraged
common tactics—the types of tactics that are available to nation-state and non-
state cyber actors, alike—with limited success in compromising networks and
accounts. We have not attributed the activity to anyforeign adversaries, and we
continue to work to identify the actors behind these operations. At this time, all
these activities were either prevented or have been mitigated.
) Specifically:
Unidentified cyber actors since at least April 2018 and as recently as early
October continue to engage in a range of potential elections-related cyber
incidents targeting election infrastructure using spear-phishing, database
exploitation techniques, and denial ofservice attacks, possibly indicating
continued interest in compromising the availability, confidentiality, and integrity
ofthese systems. For example, on 24 August 2018, cybersecurity officials
detected multiple attempts to illegally access the State of Vermont's Online Voter
Registration Application (OLVR), which serves as the state's resident voter
registration database, according to DHS reporting. The malicious activity
included one Cross Site Scripting attempt, seven Structured Query Language
(SQL) injection attempts, and one attempted Denial of Service (DoS) attack. All
attempts were unsuccessful.
In summarizing the ongoing threat to U.S. election systems, DHS further
said in the same product, "We continue to assess multiple elements of U.S. election
infrastructure are potentially vulnerable to cyber intrusions."
B. (U) Russian Access to Election Infrastructure
DHS, Homeland Security Intelligence Assessment, Cyber Actors Continue to Engage in Influence
Activities and Targeting ofElection InJ'rastructure, October 1 1, 2018.
(U) Ibid.
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(U) The January 6, 2017 Intelligence Community Assesbinent (IL'A), "Assessing
Russian Activities and Intentions in Recent U.S. Elections," states:
Russian intelligence obtained and maintained access to elements of multiple U.S.
state or local electoral boards. DHS assesses that the types ofsystems Russian
actors targeted or compromised were not involved in vote tallying.
Based on the Committee's review of the ICA, the Committee concurs
with this assessment. The Committee found that Russian-affiliated cyber actors gained
access to election infrastructure systems across two states, including successful extraction
of voter data. However, none of these systems were involved in vote tallying.
1. (U) Russian Access to Election Infrastructure: Illinois
(U) In June 2016, Illinois experienced the first known breach by Russian actors of state
election infrastructure during the 2016 election. As of the end of 2018, the Russian cyber
actors had successfully penetrated Illinois's voter registration database, viewed multiple database
tables, and accessed up to 200.000 voter registration records. The compromise resulted in the
exfiltration of an unknown quantity of voter registration data. Russian cyber actors were in a
position to delete or change voter data, but the Committee is not aware of any evidence that thev
did so.
•  assesses with high confidence that the penetration was carried out by
Russian actors.'^"
) The compromised voter registration database held records relating to 14
million registered voters. The
records exfiltrated included information on each voter's name, address, partial social
security number, date of birth, and either a driver's license number or state identification
number.
(U) Intelligence Community Assessment, Assessing Russian Activities and Intentions in Recent U.S. Elections,
Januar^6^017, p. iii.(L Jjjjjj^^) DHS IIR 4 005 0006, An IP Address Targeted Multiple U.S. State Government's to Include Election
Systems. October 4, 2016; DHS briefing for SSCI staff. March 5, 2018.
(L) "Illinois election ofllclals say hack yielded information on 200,000 voters," [Local Newspaper], August 29,
2016.
(LI) DHS IIRI^
SCI open Hearing on June 21,2017, p 110
(U) State Board of Elections, Illinois Voter Registration System Records Breached, August 31, 2016. As reflected
elsewhere in this report, the Committee did not undertake its own forensic analysis of the Illinois server logs to
corroborate this statement; SSCI interview with DHS and CTllC, February 27, 2018, p. 24.
(U) See infra, "Russian Scanning and Attempted Access to Election-Related Infrastructure" for a complete
discussion on attribution related to the set of cyber activitv linked (o die infrastructure used in the Illinois breach.
''' FBI IIrI
DHS intelligence Assessment, May 3, 2017,0144-17,
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DHS staff further recounted to the Committee that "Russia would have
had the ability to potentially manipulate some of that data, but we didn't see that."
Further, DHS staff noted that "the level of access that they gained, they almost certainly
could have done more. Why they didn't... is sort of an open-ended question. I think it
fits under the larger umbrella of undermining confidence in the election by tipping their
hand that they had this level of access or showing that they were capable of getting it."'^^
•  (U) According to a Cyber Threat Intelligence Integration Center (CTIIC) product,
Illinois officials "disclosed that the database has been targeted frequently by hackers, but
this was the first instance known to state officials of success in accessing it."'^"^
(U) In June 2017, the Executive Director of the Illinois State Board of Elections (SEE),
Steve Sandvoss, testified before the Committee about Illinois's experience in the 2016
elections. He laid out the following timeline:
•  (U) On June 23, 2016, a foreign actor successfully penetrated Illinois's databases
through an SQL attack on the online voter registration website. "Because of the initial
low-volume nature of the attack, the State Board of Election staff did not become aware
of it at first."
•  (U) Three weeks later, on July 12, 2016, the IT staff discovered spikes in data flow
across the voter registration database server. "Analysis of the server logs revealed that
the heavy load was a result of rapidly repeated database queries on the application status
page of our paperless online voter application website."
•  (U) On July 13, 2016, IT staff took the website and database offline, but continued to see
activity from the malicious IP address.
•  (U) "Firewall monitoring indicated that the attackers were hitting SEE IP addresses five
times per second, 24 hours a day. These attacks continued until August 12"^ [2016], when
they abruptly ceased."
(U) SSCI interview with DHS and CTIIC, February 27, 2018, p. 14.
(U) CTIIC Cyber Threat Intelligence Summary, August 18, 2016.
(U) SSCI Open Hearing on June 21, 2017. The Committee notes that, in his testimony, Mr. Sandvoss said Illinois
still had not been definitively told that Russia perpetrated the attack, despite DHS's high confidence. The Committee
also notes that DHS eventually provided a briefing to states during which DHS provided further information on this
topic, including the DHS high-confidence attribution to Russia.
Ibid.,-p.m.
(U) Ibid.
Ibid., p. 111.
(U) Ibid.
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(U) On July 19, 2016, the election staff notified the Illinois General Assembly and the
Attorney General's office.
(U) Approximately a week later, the FBI contacted Illinois.'®^
(U) On July 28, 2016, both the registration system and the online voter registration
became fully functional again.
2. (U) Russian Access to Election Infrastructure: State 2
Separately, GRU cyber actors breached election
infrastructure in State 2.
p. 113.
(U) Ibid., p. 112.
FBI Electronic Communication.j(U
in hid
164
(U) FBI Briefing on [State 2] Election Systems, June 25,2018.
(U) DHS briefing for SSCl staff, March 5,2018.
(D) Ibid.
' Vtlil DTS 2018-2416; FBI Briefing on [State 2] Election Systems, June 25,2018, p. 16.(li) SSCl interview with DHS and CTIIC, February 27, 2018, compartmented session.
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(U) FBI and DHS Interactions with State
August 18, 2016 (U) FBI FLASH notification identified IP addresses targeting
election offices.
August 24, 2016 (U) State 2 Department of State received the FLASH from
National Association of Secretaries of State.
August 26, 2016 (U) State 2 Department of State forwarded FLASH to counties and
advised them to block the IP addresses.
Separately, H^^^HP^etennir^ one of the listed IP
addresses scanned its systemU^^^^^^^H subsequently
discovered suspeeted intrusion activity and contacted the FBI.'^'*
"2 (U) Ibid.
(L) ibid.
DTS 2018-2416; FBI Briefing on [State 2] Election Systems, June 25, 2018, pp. 7.
ibid. 5'ee o/so EB-0004893-LED
(^^^1 interview with DHS and CTllC, February 27, 2018, p. 42.
' DTS 2018-2416; FBI Briefing on [State 2] Election Systems, June 25. 2018, pp. 7.
(II) FBI KLASI I. Alert NumberT-LD1004-TT, TLP-AMBER,I
DI S 2018-2416; FBI Briefing on [State 2] Election Systems, June 25, 2018, p. 4.
'8-(u775^.,pp. 4-5.
(\})lbid.,^. 5.
(U) Ibid.
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August 31, 2016 FBI opened its investigation on and
"conducted outreach to State 2 county election oflicials to discuss
individual security postures and any suspicious activity."'®^ FBI
outreach reveals that one State 2 county—County A—was
scanned.
September 30, 2016 FBI held a conference call with county election officials to
advise of the attempt to probe County A. FBI also notified state
and local officials of available DHS services.
October 4, 2016 County B's IT administrator contacted FBI regarding a
potential intrusion. According to the FBI, "Of particular
concern, the activity included a connection to a county voting,
testing, and maintenance server used for poll worker classes."
October 14,2016 (U) FBI shared County B indicators by issuing a FLASH.
December 29, 2016 (U) DHS and FBI released a Joint Analysis Report (JAR) on the
"GRIZZLY STEPPE" intrusion set; report represents the first IC
attribution of state election-related systems to the Russians.
June 2017 (U) DHS notified State 2 counties of a possible intrusion "as part
of a broader notification to 122 entities identified as spearphishing
victims in an intelligence report."'^'*
DTS 2018-2416; FBI Briefing on [State 2] Election Systems, June 25,2018, p. 5.
iV)Ibid,pp. 5-6.
'®®(U)/6W.,p. 6.
(U) Ibid
(U) Ibid
I-)! FBI FLASH, Alert Number T-LD1005-TT. TLP-AMBER,|
(U) DHS/FBl, Joint Analysis Report, JAR-16-20296A7grTzZLY STEPPE - Russian Malicious Cyber Activity,
Decemtw 29, 2016.
DTS 2018-2416; FBI Briefing on [State 2] Election Systems, June 25, 20! 8, p. 7.
^'^{V)Jbid
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July 2017 (U) FBI published a FLASH report waiiiiiig of possible
spearphishing.'"^''
November 2017 (U) FBI and DBS participated in the first meeting of the State 2
elections task force.
February 2018 (U) FBI requested direct engagement with Counties B, C, and D,
including a reminder of available DBS services.
March 2018 (U) FBI reports that "our office engaged" the affected counties
through the local FBI field office. The FBI could not provide
any further detail on the substance of these engagements to the
Committee.
May 29, 2018 FBI provided a SECRET Letterhead Memo to DBS
"fomi^ly advising of our investigation into the intrusion
the reported intrusion at County B, and suspected
compromises of Counties C and D."
June 11,2018 (U) FBI reports that as of June 11, 2018, Counties A, B, C, and D
had not accepted DBS services.^®®
(11) FBI FLASH, Alert Number EB-000083-LD. TLP-AMBER.j
I. 5cvDTS20]8-3[74.
DTS 2018-2416; FBI Briefing on [State 2] Election Systems, June 25, 2018, p. 7.
•''' (U) Ibid., p. 6.
"«(lJ)/6/W.,p. 34.
'''(lJ)/6/</.,pp. 8-9.
(U)M/t/.,p.20.
^^^0^^24J_6^^BIDriefing on [State 2] Election Systems, June 25,2018, pp. 20-21.
^DHS briefing for SSCI staff, March 5,2018.
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•  (U) State 2's Secretary of State and Election Director told the Committee in December
2017 that there was "never an attack on our systems." "We did not see any unusual
activities. I would have known about it personally."-"^ State 2 did not want to share
with the Committee its cybersecurity posture, but state officials communicated that they
are highly confident in the security of their systems.-"^
•  (U) State 2's election apparatus is highly decentralized, with each county making its own
decisions about acquiring, configuring, and operating election systems.-"^
•  (U) As of August 9, 2018, DHS was complimentary of the steps State 2 had taken to
secure its voting systems, including putting nearly all counties on the ALBERT sensor
system, joining the Elections Infrastructure Information Sharing and Analysis Center (El-
ISAC), and using congressionally appropriated funds plus additional state funds to hire
cybersecurity advisors.-"^
C. (IJ) Russian Efforts to Research U.S. Voting Systems, Processes, and Other
Elements of Voting Infrastructure
(U) Memorandum for the Record, SSCl Staff, Conference Call with [Slate 2], December
2'" (U) Ibid.
205(U) Ibid
2017.
.
(L^OTS 2018-2581, Memorandum for the Record. Telephone call with DHS, August 9. 2018.
KBl LHM.l
p. 5.
Note: "FISA" refers to electronic surveillance collected on a foreign power or an agent of a foreign
power pursuant to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978. This collection could have come from
landiines, electronic mail accounts, or mobile phones used by personnel at a foreign embassy (i.e., an
"establishment" FISA) or used by personnel associated with a foreign power (i.e., "agents of a foreign power"). This
FISA collection would have been approved by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court ("FISC"), effectuated by
FBI, and then could also have been shared with NSA or CIA, or both, depending on the foreign target.
28
COMMITTEE SENSITIVE - RITSSIA INVESTIGATION ONLY
COMMi rrBH SENSI riVE - RUSSIA INVESTIGATION ONLY
is unicnown it Tarantsov attended the events.
D, (U) Russian Activity Directed at Voting Machine Companies
FBI LHM,
FBI LHM,
210
21 I
^'=(11) Ibid
p. 3.
p. 4.
215 (U) Jbid
216 IhU . 5.
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Russian L^uvcrnment actors en^aiied attacks on
election systems.
FBI reported that "between December 2015 and June 2016.
cyber actors had scanned
of election systems.^'^
DHS further told the Committee that malicious
a widely-used vendor
E. (U) Russian Efforts to Observe Polling Places
Department of State were aware that Russia was attempting to
send election observers to polling places in 2016. The true intention of these efforts is
unknown.
2IS
rBi l.lectronic
I') DHS brietlnji tor SSCI staff March 5. 2018.
■' (U) Ibid.
222 (U) Ibid.
223 (U) NSA
22'* (U) Ibid., pp^
225 (U) FBI IIR
226 (U) Ibid.
DIRNSA, May 5,2017, p. 3.
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The Russian Embassy placed a formal request lo observe the elections
with the Department of State, but also reached outside diplomatic channels in an attempt
to secure permission directly from state and local election officials."' For example, in
September 2016, the State 5 Secretary of State denied a request by the Russian Consul
General to allow a Russian government official inside a polling station on Election Da'
to study the U.S. election process, accon "" "
mission.
nterfere
(U) DTS 2018-2152, SSCI Transcript of the Interview of Andrew McCabe, Former Deputy Director of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation, February 14,2018, pp. 221-222.
(U) Ibid.
(U) Ibid.
(U) Ibid.
Email November from2016sent
suDject: Kisi\;ik I'roiost
(ember 13. 2016: from:
aeiics.
Scsentnia
uh cct: Russia
visas/travel.
2" (U) Ibid.
^^U\})lhid.
nd from
RE; Kisiyak Protest of FBI Tactics — StCRt 1 //NOFORN.
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r
Russian Activity Possibly Related to a Misinformation Campaign on Voter
236^H|||| DTS 2018-3952; MFR of Interview with Randy Coleman, December 5,2018.
(U) DIRNSA, May 5, 2017.
(U) Ibid.
(U) SSCl Interview with DHS and CTIIC, February 27, 2018,
240r FBI IIR
47-48.
FBI LHM.
(Ij) Ibid
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(U) The declassified, January 6, 2017, Intelligence Community Assessment also
highlighted preparations related to voter fraud, noting that Russian diplomats "were prepared to
publicly call into question the validity of the results" and that "pro-Kremlin hloggers had
prepared a Twitter campaign, #Dcmoci acyRIP, on election night in anticipation of Secretary
Clinton's victory, judging from their social media activity."-''^
(U) During a 2017 election. State 17 saw hot activity on social media, including
allegations of voter fraud, in particular on Reddit. State 17 had to try to prove later that there
was no fraud.
H. (U) Two Unexplained Events
1. (U) Cyber Activity in State 22
(VyTntelligcnce Coinnuiiiity Assessment, Assessing Russian Activities and intentions in Recent U.S. Elections^
January 6, 2017, p. 2.
(U) See Memorandum for the Record. SSCI Staff, Conference Call with State 17, January 25, 2018. The
Committee notes it is conducting a related Investigation into the use of social media by Russian-government
affiliated entities.
247 Fusion Center model is a partnership between DHS and state, local, tribal, and territorial entities. They
serve as a focal point for 'the receipt, analysis, gathering, and sharing of threat-related information."
(U) CTIIC Cyber Threat Intelligence Summary/Cyber Threats in Focus, Malicious Cyber Activity on Election-
Related Computer Networks Last Spring Possibly Linked to Russia, October 7,2016; DHS, IIR 4 019 0147 16,
September 28,2016.
(U) Ibid.
"0 (U) Ibid.
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2. (U) Cyber Activity in State 4
State 4 officials, DHS, and FBI in the spring and summer of 2016, struggled
to understand who was responsible for two rounds of cyber activity related to election
infrastructure. Eventually, one set of cyber activity was attributed to Russia and one was not
First, in April of 2016, a cyber actor successfully targeted State 4 with a
phishing scam. After a county employee opened an infected email attachment, the cyber actor
stole credentials, which were later posted online."^' Those stolen credentials were used in June
2016 to penetrate State 4's voter registration database.-" A CTIIC product reported the incident
as follows: "An unknown actor viewed a statewide voter registration database after obtaining a
state employee's credentials through phishing and keystroke logging malware, according to a
private-sector DHS partner claiming secondhand access. The actor used the credentials to access
the database and was in a position to modify county, but not statewide, data.'""
DHS analysis of forensic data provided by a private sector partner
discovered malware on the system, and State 4 shut down the voter registration system for about
eight days to contain the attack. State 4 officials later told the Committee that that while the
cyber actor was able to successfully log in to a workstation connected to election related
infrastructure, additional credentials would have been needed for the cyber actor to access the
voter registration database on that system.-"
(U) At first, FBI told State 4 officials that the attack may have originated from Russia,
but the ties to the Russian government were unclear. "The Bureau described the threat as
'credible' and significant, a spokesman for State 4 Secretary of State said."^^^ State 4 officials
also told press that the hacker had used a server In Russia, but that the FBI could not confirm the
251 U)
interview with DHS and CTIIC, February 27, 2018, p. 38.
Cyber Threat intelligence Integration Center (CTIIC), Compromised State Election Networks,
Novemo^2,2016. p. I.
DHS IIR 4 005 0829 16, A U.S. Slate Governmeni's Election System Targeted by
Malicious Activity, September 9, 2016; Memorandum for the Record, SSCI Staff, Conference Call with [State 4],
December 1,2017.
(U) MemoraiulLini fm- ihc Record. SSCI Staff. Conrercncc Call with [Slate 41. December I '*017
25fi /jn
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attack was tied to the Russian government. DHS and FBI later assessed it to be criminal
activity, with no definitive tie to the Russian government.
Subsequently, Russian actors engaged in the same scanning activity as
seen in other states, but directed at a domain affiliated with a public library. Officials saw no
effective penetration of the system. DHS has low confidence that this cyber activity is
attributable to the Russian intelligence services because the target was unusual and not directh
involved in elections.^®"
V. (U) RUSSIAN INTENTIONS^
(U) Russian intentions regarding U.S. election infrastructure remain unclear. Russia
might have intended to exploit vulnerabilities in election infrastructure during the 2016 elections
and, for unknown reasons, decided not to execute those options. Alternatively, Russia might
have sought to gather information in the conduct of traditional espionage activities. Lastly,
Russia might have used its activity in 2016 to catalog options or clandestine actions, holding
them for use at a later date. Based on what the IC knows about Russia's operating procedures
and intentions more broadly, the IC assesses that Russia's activities against U.S. election
infrastructure likely sought to further their overarching goal; undermining the integrity of
elections and American confidence in democracy.
•  (U) Former-Homeland Security Adviser Lisa Monaco told the Committee that "[tjhere
was agreement [in the IC] that one of the motives that Russia was trying to do with this
active measures campaign was to sow distrust and discord and lack of confidence in the
voting process and the democratic process."^®^
DHS representatives told the Committee that "[w]e see . .. Russians in
particular obviously, gain access, learn about the environment, learn about what systems
are interconnected, probing, the type of intelligence preparation of the environment that
you would expect from an actor like the Russians. So certainly the context going forward
' (U) SSCI interview with DHS and CTIIC, February 27, 2018, p. 40
U
260 DHS/FBI Homeland Intelligence Brief,
(U) Ibid.
(U) SSCI Transcript of the Interview with of Lisa Monaco, Former Homeland Security Advisor, August 10,
2017, p. 30.
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is a concern of what they might have learned and how much moi c they know about the
systems."^*^^
Mr. McCabe told the Committee that it seemed to him like "classic
Russian c>bci espionage.. .. [They will] scrape up all the information and the experience
they possibly can," and "they might not be effective the first time or the fifth time, but
they are going to keep at it until they can come back and do it in an effective way."^^"^
Mr. Daniel told the Committee:
While any one voting machine is fairly vulnerable, as has been
demonstrated over and over again publicly, the ability to actually
do an operation to change the outcome ofan election on the scale
you would need to, and do it surreptitiously, is incredibly difficult.
A much more achievable goal would be to undermine confidence in
the results ofthe electoral process, and that could be done much
more effectively and easily. ... A logical thing woidd be, if your
goal is to undermine confidence in the U.S. electoral system—
which the Russians have a long goal ofwanting to put themselves
on the same moral plane as the United States ... one way would
be to cause chaos on election day. How could you start to do that?
Mess with the voter registration databases.
I Ms. Monaco further echoed that concern:
Well, one of the things I worried about—and I wasn't alone in
this—is kind of worst-case scenarios, which would be things like
the voter registration databases. So if you 're a state and local
entity and your voter registration database is housed in the
secretary of state's office and it is not encrypted and it's not
backed up, and it says Lisa Monaco lives at Smith Street and I
show up at my [pollingplace] and they say 'Well we don V have
Ms. Monaco at Smith Street, we have her at Green Street,' now
there's diffiiculty in my voting. And ifthat were to happen on a
large scale, I was worried about confusion at polling places, lack
ofconfidence in the voting system, anger at a large scale in some
areas, confusion, distru.st. So there was a whole sliding scale of
2" (U) SSCI interview with DHS and CTIIC, February 27, 2018, p. 15.
(U) DTS 2018-2152, SSCI Transcript of the Interview with Andrew McCabe, Former Deputy Director of the
FBI, February 14, 2018, pp. 224-225.
(U) SSCI Transcript of the Interview with Michael Daniel, Former Assistant to the President and Cybersecurity
Coordinator, National Security Council, August 31,2017, pp. 27,34.
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horribles just when you 're talking about voter registration
databases?^^
(U) Chaos on Election Day: Three Scenarios
Mr. Daniel said that in the early fall of 2016, a policy working group was looking at
three scenarios:
One was, could the Russians do something to the voter registration databases that
could cause problems on Election Day? An example of that would be, could you go in
and flip the digits in everybody's address, so that when they show up with their photo
ID it doesn 't match what's in the poll book? It doesn 't actually prevent people from
voting. In most cases you 'II still get a provisional ballot, but if this is happening in a
whole bunch ofprecincts for just about everybody showing up, it gives the impression
that there's chaos.
A second one was to do a variant of the penetrating voting machines, except this time
what you do is you do a nice video of somebody conducting a hack on a voting machine
and showing how you could do that hack and showing them changing a voting
outcome, and then you post that on YouTube and you claim you've done this 100,000
times across the United States, even though you haven't actually done it at all.
Then the third scenario that we looked at was conducting a denial of service attack on
the Associated Press on Election Day, because pretty much everybody, all those nice
maps that everybody puts up on all the different news services, is in fact actually based
on Associated Press stringers at all the different precincts and locations. ... It doesn't
actually change anything, but it gives the impression that there's chaos.
V
(U) SSCI Transcript of the Interview with Lisa Monaco, Former Homeland Security Advisor, August 10,2017,
p. 28.
267
(U) SSCI Transcript of the Interview with Michael Daniel, Former Assistant to the President and Cybersecurity
•Coordinator, National Security Council, August 31,2017, p. 33.
(U) Ibid., pp. 34-35.
2^°(U)/dW.,p.35.
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VI. (U) NO EVIDENCE OF CHANGED VOTES OR MANIPULATED VOTE TALLIES
(U) In its review, the Committee has seen no indications that votes were changed, vote-
tallying systems were manipulated, or that any voter registration data was altered or deleted,
although the Committee and IC's insight is limited. Pol! workers and voting monitors did not
report widespread suspicious activity surrounding the 2016 election. DHS Assistant Secretary
Jeanette Manfra said in the Committee's open hearing in June 2017 that "1 want to reiterate that
we do have confidence in the overall integrity of our electoral system because our voting
infrastructure is fundamentally resilient." Further, all three witnesses in that hearing—Ms.
Manfra, Dr. Files, and FBI Assistant Director for Counterintelligence Bill Priestap—agreed that
they had no evidence that votes themselves were changed in any way in the 2016 election.
•  (U) Dr. Files said that DHS "assessed that multiple checks and redundancies in U.S.
election infrastructure, including diversity of systems, non-internet connected voting
machines, pre-election testing and processes for media, campaign and election officials to
check, audit, and validate the results—all these made it likely that cyber manipulation of
the U.S. election systems intended to change the outcome of the national election would
be detected. He later said "the level of effort and scale required to change the
outcome of a national election would make it nearly impossible to avoid detection."^'^
•  (U) States did not report either an uptick in voters showing up at the polls and being
unable to vote or a larger than normal quantity of provisional ballots.
(U) The Committee notes that nationwide elections are often won or lost in a small
number of precincts. A sophisticated actor could target efforts at districts where margins are
already small, and disenfranchising only a small percentage of voters could have a
disproportionate impact on an election's outcome.
(U) Many state election officials emphasized their concern that press coverage of, and
increased attention to, election security could create the very impression the Russians were
seeking to foster, namely undermining voters' confidence in election integrity. Several insisted
that whenever any official speaks publicly on this issue, they should state clearly the difference
between a "scan" and a "hack," and a few even went as far as to suggest that U.S. officials stop
(U) SSCl Transcript of the Open Hearing on Russian Interference in the 2016 U.S. Elections, held on
Wednesday. June 21,2017.
(U) SSCL Transcript of the Open Hearing on Russian Interference in the 2016 U.S. Elections, held on
Wednesday, June 21,2017, p. 13.
(t) Ibid., p. 47.
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talking about the issue altogether. One state official said, "Wc need to walk a fine line between
being fortheoming to the public and protecting voter eonfidenee."-^''
(U) Mr. Brennan described a similar concern in IC and policy discussions:
JVe know that the Rtissians had already touched some ofthe electoral systems,
and we know that they have capable cyber capabilities. So there was a real
dilemma, even a conundrum, in terms of what do you do that's going to try to
stave offworse action on the part of the Russians, and what do you do that is
going to . .. [give] the Russians what they were seeking, which was to really raise
the specter that the election was not going to be fair and unaffected.275
(U) Most state representatives interviewed by the Committee were confident that they
met the threat effectively in 2016 and believed that they would continue to defeat threats in 2018
and 2020. Many had interpreted the events of 2016 as a success story: firewalls deflected the
hostile activity, as they were supposed to, so the threat was not an issue. One state official told
the Committee, "I'm quite confident our state security systems are pretty sound. Another
state official stated, "We felt good [in 2016]," and that due to additional security upgrades, "we
feel even better today."-^'
(U) However, as of 2018, some states were still grappling with the severity of the threat.
One official highlighted the stark contrast they experienced, when, at one moment, they thought
elections were secure, but then suddenly were hearing about the threat.-^^ The official went on
to conclude, "I don't think any of us expected to be hacked by a foreign government."-^'^
Another official, paraphrasing a former governor, said, "If a nation-state is on the other side, it's
not a fair fight. You have to phone a friend."-^"
(U) In the month before Election Day, DHS and other policymakers were planning for
the worst-case scenario of efforts to disrupt the vote itself. Federal, state, and local governments
created incident response plans to react to possible confusion at the polling places. Mr. Daniel
said of the effort: "We're most concerned about the Russians, but obviously we are also
concerned about the possibility for just plain old hacktivism on Election Day. ... The incident
response plan is actually designed ... to help us [plan for] what is the federal government going
to do if bad things start to happen on Election Day?"
Mr. Daniel added that this was the first opportunity to exercise the process
established under Presidential Policy Directive-4I. "We asked the various agencies with lead
(U) Memorandum for the Record, SSCI Staff Conference Call with [State 8], February 2,2018.
(t) SSCI Transcript of the Interview with John Brennan, Former Director, CIA, held on Friday, June 23,2017, p.
54.
(U) Memorandum for the Record, SSCI Staff Conference Call with [State 6], November 17, 2017.
(LI) Memorandum for the Record, SSCI Staff, Conference Call with [State 8], February 2, 2018.
(U) Memorandum for the Record, SSCI Staff, Conference Call with [State 20], November 17,2017.
(L) ibid.
(U) Memorandum for the Record, SSCI Staff, Conference Call with [State 9], November 17,2017.
39
COMMITTEE SENSITIVE - RUSSIA INVESTIGATION ONLY
COMMTiTEH SENSITIVE - RUSSIA INVESTIGATION ONLY
responsibility, all right, give us your Election Day plan." That led to the creation of an Election
Day playbook; steps included enhanced watch floor procedures, connectivity between FBI field
offices and FBI and DEIS, and an "escalation path" if "we needed to get to Lisa [Monaco] or
Susan [Rice] in a hurry" on Election Day.-^'
VII. (U) SECURITY OF VOTING MACHINES
(U) The Committee review of Russian activity in 2016 highlighted potential
vulnerabilities in many voting machines, with previous studies by security researchers taking on
new urgency and receiving new scrutiny. Although researchers have repeatedly demonstrated it
is possible to exploit vulnerabilities in electronic voting machines to alter votes, some election
officials dispute whether such attacks would be feasible in the context of an actual election.
•  (U) Dr. Alex Halderman, Professor of Computer Science at the University of Michigan,
testified before the Committee in June 2017 that "our highly computerized election
infrastructure is vulnerable to sabotage and even to cyber attacks that could change
votes. Dr. Halderman concluded, "Voting machines are not as distant from the
internet as they may seem."-^'^
•  (U) When State 7 decommissioned its Direct-Recording Electronic (DRE) voting
machines in 2017, the IT director led an exercise in attempting to break into a few of the
machines using the access a "normal" voter would have in using the machines."^^ The
results were alarming: the programmed password on some of the machines was ABC 123,
and the testers were able to flip the machines to supervisor mode, disable them, and "do
enough damage to call the results into question."-^^ The IT director shared the results
with State 21 and State 24, which were using similiar machines."^'
•  (U) In 2017, DEFCON^®^ researchers were able to find and exploit vulnerabilities in five
different electronic voting machines.-^^ The WinVote machines, those recently
decertified by State 7, were most easily manipulated. One attendee said, "It just took us a
couple of hours on Google to find passwords that let us unlock the administrative
(U) Ibid., p. 82.
(U) See also, infra, "Direct-Recording Electronic (DRE) Voting Machine Vulnerabilities."
(ll) SSCI Transcript of the Open Hearing on Russian Interference in the 2016 U.S. Elections, held on
Wednesday, June 21, 2017, p. 117.
(U)/A/rf., p. no.
(U) Memorandum for the Record, SSCi Staff, Conference Call with [State 7], January 25, 2018.
(U) ibid. The machines used were WinVote voting machines.
(U) Ibid.
(U) DEFCON is an annual hacker conference held in Las Vegas, Nevada. In July 2017, at DEFCON 25, the
conference featured a Voting Machine Hacking Village ("Voting Village") which acquired and made available to
conference participants over 25 pieces of election equipment, including voting machines and electronic poll books,
for generally unrestricted examination for vulnerabilities.
(LI) Matt Blaze, et. al., DEFCON 25: Voting Machine Hacking Village: Report on Cyber Vulnerabilities in U.S.
Election Equipment. Databases, and Infrastructure, September 2017, https://www.defcon.org/images/defcon-
25/DEF%20CON%2025%20voting%20report.pdf, pp. 8-13.
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functions on this machine."^^" A researcher was able to hack into the WinVote over
WiEi within minutes using a vulnerability from 2003.-'^' Once he had administrator-level
access, he could change votes in the database. Researchers also discovered available
USB ports in the machine that would allow a hacker to run software on the machine.^^^
One said "with physical access to back [sic] of the machine for 15 seconds, an attacker
can do anything.""^^ Hackers were less successful with other types of machines,
although each had recorded vulnerabilities.
(U) The 2018 DRFCON report found similar vulnerabilities, in particular when hackers
had physical access to the machines. For example, hackers exploited an old vulnerability
on one machine, using either a removable device purchasable on eBay or remote access,
to modify vote counts.
DHS briefed the Committee in August 2018 that these results were in part
because the hackers had extended physical access to the machines, which is not realistic
for a true election system. Undersecretary Krebs also disagreed with reporting that a 17-
year-old hacker had accessed voter tallies. Some election experts have called into
question the DEFCON results for similar reasons and pointed out that any fraud requiring
physical access would be, by necessity, small scale, unless a government were to deploy
agents across thousands of localities.
(U) ES&S Voting Systems disclosed that some of its equipment had a key security
vulnerability. ES&S installed remote access software on machines it sold in the mid-
2000s, which allowed the company to provide IT support more easily, but also created
potential remote access into the machines. When pressed by Senator Ron Wyden of
Oregon, the company admitted that around 300 voting jurisdictions had the software.
ES&S says the software was not installed after 2007, and it was only installed on
election-management systems, not voting machines. More than 50 percent of voters
vote on ES&S equipment, and 41 states use its products.
(L) Elizabeth Wise, "Hackers at DefCon Conference Exploit Vulnerabilities in Voting Machines," USA Today,
July 30,2017, https;//www.usatoday.coTn/story/iech/2017/07/30/hackers-defcon-conference-exploit-vulnerabilities-
voting-machines/523639001/.
(U) Matt Blaze, et. al., DEFCON 25: Voting Machine Hacking Village: Report on Cyber Vulnerabilities in U.S.
Election Equipment, Databases, and Infrastructure, September 2017, https://www.defcon.org/images/defcon-
25/DEF%20CON%2025%20voting%20report.pdf, p. 4.
2'^ (U) Ibid., p. 9.
2'^ (U) Ibid.
Ibid., pp. 8-13.
(U) Robert McMillian and Dustin Volz, "Voting Machine Used in Half of U.S. Is Vulnerable to Attack, Report
Finds," Wall Street Journal, September 27, 2018. The machine referenced is the ES«&S Model 650, vshich ES&S
stopped making in 2008 but is still available for sale.
(U) DTS 2018-3275, Summary of 8/22/2018 All Senators Election Security Briefing, August 28, 2018
(U) Hacks, Security Gaps And Oligarchs: The Business of Voting Comes Under Scrutiny. Miles Parks, NPR,
September 21, 2018.
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(U) Advocates of electronic voting point out the flaws in paper ballots, like the potential
for the introduction of fraudulent ballots or invalidated votes due to stains or extra marks. The
Committee believes that any election system should be protected end-to-end, including against
fraud.
(U) Direct-Recording Electronic (ORE) Voting Machine Vulnerabilities
(U) While best practices dictate that electronic voting machines not be connected to the
internet, some machines are internet-enabled. In addition, each machine has to be
programmed before Election Day, a procedure often done either by connecting the machine to
a local network to download software or by using removable media, such as a thumb drive.
These functions are often carried out by local officials or contractors. If the computers
responsible for writing and distributing the program are compromised, so too could all voting
machines receiving a compromised update. Further, machines can be programmed to show
one result to the voter while recording a different result in the tabulation. Without a paper
backup, a "recount" would use the same faulty software to re-tabulate the same results,
because the primary records of the vote are stored in computer memory.
(U) Dr. Halderman said in his June 2017 testimony before SSCI:
I know America's voting machines are vulnerable because my colleagues and I have
hacked them repeatedly as part ofa decade ofresearch studying the technology that
operates elections and learning how to make it stronger. We've created attacks that
can spread from machine to machine, like a computer virus, and silently change
election outcomes. We've studied touchscreen and optical scan systems, and in every
single cose we found ways for attackers to sabotage machines and to steal votes. These
capabilities are certainly within reach for America's enemies.
Ten years ago, I was part ofthe first academic team to conduct a comprehensive
security analysis ofa DRE voting machine. We examined what was at the time the
mo.st widely used touch-screen DRE in the country and spent several months probing it
for vulnerabilities. What we found was disturbing: we could reprogram the machine to
invisibly cause any candidate to win.^^^
2^8 (L) "Some DREs also produce a printed record of the vote and show it briefly to the voter, using a mechanism
called a voter-verifiable paper audit trail, or VVPAT. While VVPAT records provide a physical record of the vote
that is a valuable safeguard against cyberattacks, research has shown that VVPAT records are difficult to accurately
audit and that voters often fail to notice if the printed record doesn't match their votes. For these reasons, most
election security experts favor optical scan paper ballots." Written Statement by J. Alex Halderman, June 21, 2017,
citing S. Goggin and M. Byrne, "An Examination of the Auditability of Voter Verified Paper Audit Trail (VVPAT)
Ballots," Proceedings ofthe 2007 USENIX/ACCURA TE Electronic Poling Technology Workshop, August 2007; B.
Campbell and M. Byrne, "Now do Voters Notice Review Screen Anomalies?" Proceedings oj the 2009
USENIX/ACCURA TE/IA PoSS Electronic Poling Technology Workshop. August 2009.
(U) The machine was the Diebold AccuVote TS, which was still used statewide in at least one state as of 2017.
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Lybersecurity experts have stinJied a wide range of U.S. voting machines—including
both DREs and optical scanners—and in every single case, they've found severe
vulnerabilities that would allow attackers to sabotage machines and to alter votes.
That's why there is overwhelming consensus in the cybersecurity and election integrity
research communities that our elections are at risk.
(U) In speaking with the Committee, federal government officials revealed concerns
about the security of voting machines and related infrastructure. Former Assistant Attorney
General for National Security John Carlin told the Committee:
"I 'm very concerned about. . . our actual voting apparatus, and the attendant
structures around it, and the cooperation between some states and the federal
government."^"' Mr. Carlin further stated, "We've literally seen it already, so
shame on us ifwe can 'tfix it heading into the next election cycles. And it's the
assessment ofevery key intel professional, which I share, that Russia's going to
do it again because they think this was successfid. So we 're in a bit ofa race
against time heading up to the two-year election. Some ofthe election machinery
that's in place should not be.
(U)_Mr. McCabe echoed these concerns, and noted that, in the last months before the
o
there.
>  X ^ lift VIIW ^WIV^IV VIJW
election, FBI identified holes in the security of election machines, saying "there's some potential
••303
(U) As of November 2016, five states were using exclusively ORE voting machines with
no paper trail, according to open source information.^"*' An additional nine states used at least
some ORE voting machines with no paper trail.^"^
•  (U) State 20 has 21 -year-old DRE machines. While the state is in the process of
replacing its entire voting system, including these machines, State 20 is aiming to have
the updates ready for the 2020 elections.
•  (U) In State 21, 50 of 67 counties as of November 2017 used DRE voting machines.
(U) SSCI Transcript of the Open Hearing on Russian Interference in the 2016 U.S. Elections, held on
Wednesday, June 21,2017, pp. 116-1 17.
(U) SSCI Transcript of the Interview with John Carlin, Former Assistant Attorney General for National Security,
held on Monday, September 25, 2017, p. 86.
'"2 (U) ihici., pp. 86-87.
(U) DTS 2018-2152, SSCI Interview with Andrew McCabe, Former Deputy Director of the FBI, February 14
2018, p. 221.
(U) BallotPedia, Voting Methods and Equipment By State,
https://balIotpedia.org/Voting_methods_and_equipment_by_state.
(IJ) ibid.
(U) Memorandum for the Record, SSCI Staff, Conference Call with [State 21}, November 17,2017.
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•  (U) State 5 used paper-hacked voting in only about hair its machines and DRE voting
machines without paper backup in the other half.^"'
•  (U) Some stales are moving to a hybrid model—an electronic voting machine with a
paper backup, often in the form of a receipt that prints after the voter submits their vote.
For example, State 12 uses some DREs, but all equipment is required to have a paper
trail, and the paper ballot is the ballot of record. State 12 also conducts a mandatory
state-wide audit. Similarly, State 13 uses some paper-based and some electronic
machines, but all are required to have a paper trail.
(U) The number of vendors selling voting machines is shrinking, raising concerns about
a vulnerable supply chain. A hostile actor could compromise one or two manufacturers of
components and have an outsized effect on the security of the overall system.
•  "My job," said Ms. Monaco when asked whether she was worried about voting
machines themselves getting hacked, "was to worry about every parade of horribles. So :
cannot tell you that that did not cross my mind. We were worried about who, how many
makers. We were worried about the supply chain for the voting machines, who were the
makers? ... Turns out I think it's just Diebold—and have we given them a defensive
briefing? So to answer your question, we were worried about it all."^'
•  Mr. McCabe pointed out that a small number of companies have "90%" of the
market for voting machines in the U.S. Before the 2016 election.
briefed a few of the companies
on vulnerabilities,^'- but a more comprehensive campaign to educate vendors and their
customers is warranted.
(U) Voluntary Voting System Guidelines
(U) Part of the voting reform implemented under The Help America Vote Act of 2002 was a
requirement that the Election Assistance Commission create a set of specifications and
requirements against which voting systems can be tested, called the Voluntary Voting System
Guidelines (VVSG). The EAC adopted the first VVSG in December 2005. The EAC then
tasked the Technical Guidelines Development Committee, chaired by the National Institute of
Standards and Technology (NIST) and including members from NASED, with updating the
guidelines. In March 2015, the EAC approved VVSG 1.1; in January 2016, the EAC adopted
(U) Memorandum for the Record, SSCl Staff, Conference Call with [State 5], December 1,2017.
(U) Memorandum for the Record, SSCl Staff, Conference Call with [State 12], December 1,2017.
(U) Ibid.
(U) Memorandum for the Record, SSCl Staff, Conference Call with [Stale 13], December 1, 2017.
(U) SSCl Transcript of the Interview with Lisa Monaco, Former Homeland Security Advisor, held on Thursday,
August 10. 2017, p. 31.
(U) SSCl Transcript of the Interview with Andy McCabe, Deputy Director of the FBI, held on Wednesday,
February 14,2018, pp. 220-221.
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an implementation plan requiring that all new voting systems bo tested against the VVSG I. I
beginning in July 2017. VVSG I.I has since been succeeded by version 2.0, which was
released for a 90-day public comment period on February 15, 2019. The EAC will compile
the feedback for Commissioners to review shortly thereafter.^'^ VVSG 2.0 includes the
following minimum security guidelines:
•  (^) An error or fault in the voting system software or hardware cannot cause an
undetectable change in election results. (9.1)
•  (U) The voting system produces readily available records that provide the ability to
check whether the election outcome is correct and, to the extent possible, identify the
root cause of any irregularities. (9.2)
•  (U) Voting system records are resilient in the presence of intentional forms of
tampering and accidental errors. (9.3)
•  (U) The voting system supports strong, configurable authentication mechanisms to
verify the identities of authorized users and includes multi-factor authentication
mechanisms for critical operations. (11.3)
•  (U) The voting system prevents unauthorized access to or manipulation of
configuration data, cast vote records, transmitted data, or audit records. (13.1)
•  (U) The voting system limits its attack surface by reducing unnecessary code, data
paths, physical ports, and by using other technical controls. (14.2)
•  (U) The voting system employs mechanisms to protect against malware. (15.3)
•  (U) A voting system with networking capabilities employs appropriate, well-vetted
modem defenses against network-based attacks, commensurate with current best
practice. (15.4)
(U) As of March 2018, 35 states required that their machines be certified by EAC, but
compliance with the VVSG standards is not mandatory. Secretary Nielsen testified before the
Committee that the United States should "seek for all states" to use the VVSG standards.
(U) EAC Commissioners Unanimously Vole to Publish VVSG 2.0 Principles and Guidelinesfor Public Comment:
https://www.eac.gOv/news/2019/02/15/eac-commissioners-unanimously-vote-to-publish-vvsg-20-principles-and-
guidelines-for-public-comment/; February 15, 2019
'''• (U) SSCI Transcript of the Open Hearing on Election Security, held on March 21,2018, p. 47.
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vm. (U) THE ROLE OF DBS AND IN l ERACTIONS WITH THE STATES
(U) The federal government's actions to address election security threats evolved
significantly from the summer of 2016 through the summer of 2018. Contemporaneous with the
Russian attacks, DHS and FBI were initially treating the situation as they would a typical
notification of a cyber incident to a non-governmental victim. By the fall of 2016, however,
DHS was attempting to do more extensive outreach to the states. Then in the fall of 2017, DHS
undertook an effort to provide a menu of cyber support options to the states.
A. (U) DHS's Evolution
For DHS and other agencies and departments tasked with intelligence collection
or formulating policy options through the interagency process, the full scope of the threat began
to emerge in the summer of 2016. Secretary Johnson told the Committee that "I know I had
significant concerns by [summer of 2016] about doing all we could to ensure the cybersecurity of
our election systems. Mr. Daniel said in his interview that by the end of July, the interagency
was focused on better protecting electoral infrastructure as part of a "DHS and FBI-led domestic
effort."^
B Policymakers quickly realized, however, that DHS was poorly positioned to
d of support states needed. Mr. Daniel said that interagency discussions about the
threat "start[ed] a process of us actually realizing that, frankly, we don't actually have very much
in the way of capability that we can directly offer the states"—a fact that the states themselves
would later echo.^'^
•  Monaco said that DHS initially found a "pretty alarming variance in the
number of voting registration databases and lack of encryption and lack of backup for all
of these things."^ Ms. Monaco added that "[i]n light of what we were seeing, in light of
the intelligence we were getting briefed on, this was a very specific direction and
decision to say we need to really accelerate this, put a significant push on resources and
engagement at the senior-most levels."^
•  Mr. Daniel and the working group identified DHS's cyber teams as possible
assistance to the states. "DHS had teams that could go and provide that support to the
private sector. We've been doing that. That's a program that existed for years for critical
(L) SSCl Transcript of the Interview with Jeh Johnson, Former Secretary of Homeland Security, held on
Monday, June 12, 2017, p. 10.
(U) SSCl Transcript of the Interview with Michael Daniel, Former Special Assistant to the President and
Cybersecurity Coordinator, National Security Council, held on Wednesday, August 31, 2017, p. 28.
3"(IJ)/6/rf.,p.38.
(U) SSCl Transcript of the Interview with Lisa Monaco, Former Homeland Security Advisor, held on Thursday,
August 10, 2017, SSCl interview of Lisa Monaco, August 10, 2017, p. 19.
p.2L
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infrasli uclure companies. And we realized that we could repurpose [some of those
teams], but we don't have that many of them ... four or five. It was not very many."
(U) DHS attempted a nuanced outreach to the states on the threat. Ms. Monaco
highlighted a delicate balancing act with the interactions with states:
/ know we tried very hard to strike a balance between engaging state and local
officials andfederal officials in the importance ofraising cyber defenses and
raising cybersecurity. .. and not sowing distrust in the system, both because, one,
we believed it to be true that the system is in fact quite resilient because of what I
mentioned earlier, which is the diffuse nature; and because we did not want to, as
we described it, do the Russians' workfor them by sowing panic about the
vulnerability ofthe election
(U) In an August 15, 2016, conference call with state election officials, then-Secretary
Johnson told states, "we're in a sort of a heightened state of alertness; it behooves everyone to do
everything you can for your own cybersecurity leading up to the election." He also said that
there was "no specific or credible threat known around the election system itself. I do not
recall—I don't think, but I do not recall, that we knew about [State 4] and Illinois at that
point."^-- The Committee notes that this call was two months af^er State 4's system was
breached, and more than a month after Illinois was breached and the state shut down its systems
to contain the problem. During this call, Secretary Johnson also broached the idea of designating
election systems as critical infrastructure.
(U) A number of state officials reacted negatively to the call. Secretary Johnson said he
was "surprised/disappointed that there was a certain level of pushback from at least those who
spoke up.... The pushback was: This is our—I'm paraphrasing here: This is our responsibility
and there should not be a federal takeover of the election system."^-^
•  (U) The call "does not go incredibly well," said Mr. Daniel. "I was not on the call, no,
but all of the reporting back and then all of the subsequent media reporting that is leaked
about the call shows that it did not go well." Mr. Daniel continued: "I was actually quite
surprised ... in my head, there is this: yes, we have this extremely partisan election going
on in the background; but the Russians are trying to mess with our election. To me,
that's a national security issue that's not dependent on party or anything else."^^'*
SSCI Transcript of the Interview with Michael Daniel, Former Special Assistant to the President and
Cybersecurity Coordinator, National Security Council, held on Wednesday, August 31,2017, p. 41.
(U) SSCI Transcript of the Interview with Lisa Monaco, Former Homeland Security Advisor, held on Thursday,
August 10, 2017, p. 29.
(U) SSCI Transcript of the Interview with Jeh Johnson, Former Secretary of Homeland Security, held on
Monday, June 12,2017, p. 13.
Ibid., pp. 13-14.
(U) Ibid, p. 48.
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(U) Ms. Monaco also related how DIIS icLcived significant push back from the states
and decided to "focus our efforts on really pushing states to voluntarily accept the
assistance that DHS was trying to provide."^-^
(U) States also reported that the call did not go well. Several states told the Committee
that the idea of a critical infrastructure designation surprised them and came without
context of a particular threat. Some state officials also did not understand what a critical
infrastructure designation meant, in practical terms, and whether it would give the federal
government the power to run elections. DHS also did not anticipate a certain level of
suspicion from the states toward the federal government. As a State 17 official told the
Committee, "when someone says 'we're from the government and we're here to help,'
it's generally not a good thing."^-^
(V) Critical Infrastructure Designation
(U) One of the most controversial elements of the relationship between DHS and the states
was the decision to designate election systems as critical infrastructure. Most state officials
relayed that they were surprised by the designation and did not understand what it meant;
many also felt DHS was not open to input from the states on whether such a designation was
beneficial.
(U) Secretary Johnson remembers the first time he aired the possibility of a designation was
on August 3, 2016. He went to a reporters' breakfast sponsored by the Christian Science
Monitor and publicly "floated the idea of designating election infrastructure as critical
infrastructure."^"^ Then, on August 15, 2016, Secretary Johnson had a conference call with
election officials from all 50 states. "I explained the nature of what it means to be designated
critical infrastructure. It's not a mandatory set of [regulations], it's not a federal takeover, it's
not binding operational directives. And here are the advantages: priority in terms of our
services and the benefit of the protection of the international cyber norm."^-^ Secretary
Johnson continued: "I stressed at the time that this is all voluntary and it prioritizes assistance
if they seek it."^^^
(U) Some states were vocal in objecting to the idea. In evaluating the states' response, DHS
came to the conclusion that it should put the designation on hold, deciding it would earn more
state trust and cooperation if it held off on the designation as critical infrastructure and perhaps
sought more buy-in from the states at a later date.^^^
(U) SSCI Transcript of the Interview with Lisa Monaco, Former Homeland Security Advisor, held on Thursday,
August 10, 2017, SSCI interview of Lisa Monaco, August 10, 2017, p. 25.
"'■(U) Memorandum for the Record, SSCI Staff, Conference Call with State 17, January 25,2018.
(U) SSCI Transcript of the Interview with Jeh Johnson, Former Secretary of Homeland Security, held on
Monday, June 12, 2017, p. 10.
(T) Ibid., p. 14. For additional information on the definition of critical infrastructure in a cybersecurity contexL
see Executive Order 13636, Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity, February 12, 2013.
(H) SSCI Transcript of the Open Hearing on Election Security, March 21,2018, p. 34.
"°(U)M/f/.,p. 115.
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(U) After the election, Secretary Johnson decided the time had come to make the designation.
He held a follow-up call with NASS on the critical infrastructure designation in January 2017:
"I didn't tell them I'm doing this the next day, but I told them I was close to making a
decision. I didn't hear anything further [along the lines of additional, articulated objections],
so the same day we went public with the [unclassified] version of the report,^^' I also made the
designation."^^^
(U) Mr. Uaniel summed up the rationale for proceeding this way: "I do believe that we should
think of the electoral infrastructure as critical infrastructure, and to me it'sjust as critical for
democracy as communications, electricity, water. If that doesn't function, then your
democracy doesn't function To me that is the definition of'critical.'""^
(U) In interviews with the Committee in late 2017 and early 2018, several states were
supportive of the designation and saw the benefits of, for example, the creation of the
Government Coordinating Council. Others were lukewarm, saying they had seen limited
benefits for all the consternation officials said it had caused. Still others remained suspicious
that the designation is a first step toward a federal takeover of elections.
B. (U) The View From the States
(U) For most states, the story of Russian attempts to hack slate infrastructure was one of
confusion and a lack of information. It began with what states interpreted as an insignificant
event: an FBI FLASH notification on August 18, 2016,1
Then, mid-October, the MS-ISAC reached
out to state IT directors with an additional alert about specific IP addresses scanning websites.
At no time did MS-ISAC or DHS identify the IP addresses as associated with a nation-state
actor. Given the lack of context, state staff who received the notification did not ascribe any
additional urgency to the warning; to them, it was a few more suspect IP addresses among the
thousands that were constantly pinging state systems. Very few state IT directors informed state
election officials about the alert.
(U) Secretary Johnson was referring to the declassified version of the Intelligence Community Assessment,
Assessing Russian Aclivities and Intentions in Recent U.S. Elections. January 6, 2017.
"2(ii)/6/^.,p.46.
(U) SSCI Transcript of the Interview with Michael Daniel, Former Special Assistant to the President and
Cybersecurity Coordinator, National Security Council, held on Wednesday, August 31, 2017, p. 98.
^"^FBI FLA^AIen Number T-LDI004-TT, TLP-AMBER.|
FBI Fl.AStl, Alert Number T-L.D [UU5-TT, TLP-AMBER.||; DHS/FBI JAR-15-20223, Threats to Federal,
State, and Local (Jovernment Systems. October 14, 2016.
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•  (II) State 1 1 had Q meeting witli DHS officials, including the regional DHS cyber
advisor, in August 2016, but according to State 11 officials, DHS did not mention any
specific threat against election systems from a nation-state actor.
•  (U) Stale 13 reported that DHS contacted an affected county at one point, but never
contacted the state-level officials.^^'
•  (U) When they saw an IP address identified in the alerts had scanned their systems, State
6 and Stale 16 sent their logs to the MS-ISAC for analysis.^^*^ State 16 said it never
received a response.
(U) DHS, conversely, saw its efforts as far more extensive and effective. Ms. Manfra
testified to SSCI that DHS "held a conference call where all 50 secretaries of state or an election
director if the secretary of state didn't have that responsibility [participated], in August, in
September, and again in October [of 2016], both high-level engagement and network defense
products [sic]."^''^ Mr. Daniel reported that "by the time Election Day rolls around, all but one
state has taken us up on the offer to at least do scanning [,] so I want to give people credit for not
necessarily sticking to initial partisan reactions and ... taking steps to protect their electoral
infrastructure."^'^'
(U) States reported to the Committee that Election Day went off smoothly. For most
state election officials, concerns about a possible threat against election systems dropped off the
radar until the summer or fall of 2017. Many state election officials reported hearing for the first
time that Russian actors were responsible for scanning election infrastructure in an estimated 21
states from the press or from the Committee's open hearing on June 21, 2017. During that
hearing, in response to a question from Vice Chairman Warner inquiring whether all affected
states were aware they were attacked, Ms. Manfra responded that "[a]ll of the system owners
within those states are aware of the targeting, yes, sir."^"*- However, when pressed as to whether
election officials in each state were aware, the answer was less clear.
•  (U) In that hearing. Dr. Liles said DHS had "worked hand-in-hand with the state and
local partners to share threat information related to their networks."^'"
(U) Memorandum for the Record, SSCI Staff, Conference Call with [State 11], December 8, 2017.
"'(U) Memorandum for the Record, SSCI Staff, Conference Call with [State 13], December I, 2017.
(U) Memorandum for the Record, SSCI Staff, Conference Call with [State 6], November 17, 2017; Memorandum
for the Record, SSCI Staff, Conference Call with [State 16], December ), 2017.
(U) Ibid. State 6 did not indicate whether they received feedback from DHS.
SSCI Transcript of the Open Hearing on Russian Interference in the 2016 U.S. Elections, June 21, 2017, p.
74.
(U) SSCI Transcript of the Interview with Michael Daniel, Former Special Assistant to the President and
Cybersecurity Coordinator, National Security Council, held on Wednesday, August 31,2017, p. 49.
(U) SSCI Transcript of the Open Hearing on Russian Interference in the 2016 U.S. Elections, held on
Wednesday, June 21,2017, p. 28.
(IJ) Ibid., pp. 62-63.
^^(\})Ibid.,p. 12.
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•  (U) Ms. Manfra said, "The owners of the systems within those 21 states have been
notified." Senator King then asked, "How about the election officials in those states?"
Ms. Manfra responded, "We are working to ensure that election officials as well
understand. I'll have to get back to you on whether all 21 states .... [crosstalk].
•  (U) Given Ms. Manffa's testimony and the fact that some election officials did not get a
notification directly to their offices, election officials in many states assumed they were
not one of the 21; some even issued press releases to that effect.
(U) The disconnect between DHS and state election officials became clear during
Committee interactions with the states throughout 2017. hi many eases, DHS had notified state
officials responsible for network security, but not election officials, of the threat. Further, the IT
professionals contacted did not have the context to know that this threat was any different than
any other scanning or hacking attempt, and they had not thought it necessary to elevate the
waming to election officials.
(U) After the hearing, and in part to respond to confusion in the states, DHS held a
conference call with representatives from 50 states in September 2017. In that call, DHS said
they would contact affected states directly. State 8 state election officials noted that the call
became "somewhat antagonistic."^'^^ State 17 officials reported that the phone call "just showed
how little DHS knew about elections. Several officials argued that all 50 states should be
notified of who had been hacked. DHS followed up with one-to-one phone calls to states over
the next several days.
•  (U) Officials from some states reported being shocked that they were in facfone of the
states, and further surprised that their states had supposedly been notified.
•  (U) Most state officials found the conference calls lacking in information and were left
wondering exactly what the threat might be. Several states said the DHS representatives
could not answer any specific questions effectively.
(U) Following this series of difficult engagements, DHS set about trying to build
relationships with the states, but it faced a significant trust deficit. Early follow-up interactions
between state election officials and DHS were rocky. States reported that DHS seemed to have
little to no familiarity with elections. For example. State 6 said that the DHS representatives they
were assigned seemed to know nothing about State 6, and, when pressed, they admitted they
were "just reading the spreadsheet in front of [them]."^"^^ State 8 reported that "we are spending
62-63.
(U) State 8 said they put out a press release because DHS had said publicly that they had notified the 21 states,
and "if you were one of the 21, you would know."
(U) Memorandum for the Record, SSCI Staff, Conference Call with [State 8], February 2, 2018.
(U) Memorandum for the Record, SSCI Staff, Conference Call with [State 17], January 25, 2018.
(U) Memorandum for the Record, SSCI Staff, Conference Call with [State 6], November 17, 2017.
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a ton of time educating outside groups on how elections are run."^^'' State 3 officials said, "DHS
didn't recognize that securing an election process is not the same as securing a power grid."^^'
(U) By early 2018, State officials gave DHS credit for making significant progress over
the next six months. States began to sign up for many of the resources that DHS had to offer,
and DHS hosted the first meeting of the Government Coordinating Council required under the
critical infrastructure designation. Those interactions often increased trust and communication
between the federal and state entities. For example, DHS has identified a list of contacts to
notify if they see a threat; that list includes both IT officials and election officials. State 9
described it as "quite a turnaround for DHS," and further stated that the Secretaries of State had
been disappointed with how slowly DHS got up to speed on election administration and how
slowly the notifications happened, but DHS was "quick with the mea culpas and are getting
much better."
(U) Not all of the engagements were positive, however. State 13 in early December
2017 still reported continued frustration with DHS, indicating to the Committee that it had not
seen much change in terms of outreach and constructive engagement. As of summer 2017,
according to State 13, "the lack of urgency [at DHS] was beyond frustrating."^^^
C. (U) Taking Advantage of DHS Resonrces
(U) As DHS has pursued outreach to the states, more and more have opened their doors
to DHS assistance. DHS told the Committee that its goal has been relationship building and:
In the partnerships with the states and secretaries of states, state election
directors, and at the local level, we 're trying to shift them to a culture of more
information security management, where they can now accountfor the integrity of
their system, or, ifsomething did happen . . . they know the full extent of what
happened on their system. ... We 're providing vulnerability assessments and
trend analysis, in addition to connecting them to the threat intelligence that we
can, in order to evolve their. . . cyber culture.
(U) DHS's assistance can be highly tailored to need, and falls into roughly two buckets:
remote cyber hygiene scans, which provide up to weekly reports, and on-site risk and
vulnerability assessments. DHS also offers a suite of other services, including phishing
campaign assessments. All these efforts seek to provide the states with actionable information to
improve cyber hygiene, but DHS has been keen to avoid what could be perceived by the states as
(U) Memorandum for the Record, SSCI Staff, Conference Call with [State 8], February 2, 2018.
(U) Memorandum for the Record, SSCI Staff, Conference Call with [State 3], December 8, 2017.
(U) Memorandum for the Record, SSCI Staff, Conference Call with [State 9], November 17, 2017.
(U) Memorandum for the Record, SSCI Staff, Conference Call with [State 13], December 1, 2017.
(U) SSCI interview with DHS and CTIIC, February 27, 2018, pp. 54-55.
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unfunded mandates. Some stales icquesling more intensive services have also experienced
significant delays before DHS could send a team to assist.
•  (U) By October 2018, DHS said 35 states, 91 local jurisdictions, and eight election
system vendors had signed up for remote persistent scans.^^^ All the requests for these
scans have been fulfilled. "They can be turned on basically within the week," according
to DHS.^"
•  (U) DHSsaidthatasofOctober20I8,ithadcompIeted35 in-depth, on the ground
vulnerability assessments: 21 states, 13 localities, and one election system vendor. These
assessments are one week off-site remote scans followed by a second week on site.^^^
•  (U) Two states who completed the in-depth assessments reported in late 2017 they had
had a good experience. State 12 officials said the team was "extremely helpful and
professional."^^^ State 10 said the review was a good experience, although DHS was
somewhat limited in what it could do.^^'^ For example, DHS did a phishing email test that
showed the training for employees had worked.^^' DHS gave "good and actionable
recommendations." Although DHS "didn't really understand election systems when they
came," they learned a lot.^^-
•  (U) As of November 2017, State 6 and State 9 requested an on-site scan, but those scans
were on track to be delayed past the August 2018 primaries.^^^ State 7 was expecting a
four-to-six month delay.-^^'' State 8 signed up for a checkup in October 2017 and was due
to get service the following February.^^^ As of January 2018, State 17 also had requested
an on-site scan.^^^
(U) In a sign of improving relations between the states and DHS, two states that had
elections in 2017 attempted to include DHS in the process more extensively than in the past. In
State 17, a two-person DHS team sat with election officials during the 2017 special election and
monitored the networks. Even though "their presence was comforting," they "really didn't do
much." State 17 signed DHS's normal MOU, but also added its own clause to underscore the
state's independence: a formal sunset on DHS's access to state systems, one week affer the
3»(U)
3"(U)
358 (L)
359 (U)
360 (IJ)
3^' (L)
3«(li)
363 ((jj
for the
364 (jj)
3^5 (U)
3^(U)
Ibid, p. 60.
Ibid., p. 57.
DHS phone call with SSCI; October 16,2018.
Ibid
Memorandum for the Record, SSCI Staff. Conference Call with [State 12], December 1,2017.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Memorandum for the Record, SSCI Staff, Conference Call with [State 6], November 17,2017; Memorandum
Record, SSCI Staff, Conference Call with [State 9], November 17, 2017.
Memorandum for the Record, SSCI Staff, Conference Call with [State 7], January 25,2018.
Memorandum for the Record, SSCI Staff, Conference Call with [State 8], February 2,2018.
Memorandum for the Record, SSCI Staff, Conference Call with [State 17], January 25,2018.
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election. State 7 reported thcii experience with UHS during the 2017 statewide election was
quite good. DHS sat with election officials all day, which meant State 7 could pass messages
quickly to NCCIC.
(U) In March 2018, Congress appropriated $380 million in funding for election security
improvements. The funding was distributed under the formula laid out in the Help American
Vote Act (HAVA) and was intended to aid in replacing vulnerable voting machines and
improving cybersecurity. As of July 2018, 13 states said they intended to use the funds to buy
new voting machines, and 22 said they have "no plans to replace their machines before the
election—including all five states that rely solely on paperless electronic voting devices,"
according to a survey by Politico.^^'
IX. (U) RECOMMENDATIONS
1. (U) Reinforce States' Primacy in Running Elections*
(U) States should remain firmly in the lead on running elections, and the federal
government should ensure they receive the necessary resources and information.
2. (U) Build a Stronger Defense, Part I: Create Effective Deterrence
(U) The United States should communicate to adversaries that it will view an attack
on its election infrastructure as a hostile act, and we will respond accordingly. The U.S.
Government should not limit its response to cyber activity; rather, it should create a menu
of potential responses that will send a clear message and create significant costs for the
perpetrator.
Ideally, this principle of deterrence should be included in an overarching
cyber doctrine for the U.S. Government. That doctrine should clearly delineate
cyberespionage, cybercrime, and cyber attacks. Further, a classified portion of the doctrine
should establish what the U.S. Government believes to be its escalation ladder in the cyber
realm—what tools does it have, what tools should it pursue, and what should the limits of cyber
war be. The U.S. strategic approach tends to overmatch adversaries with superior technology,
and policymakers should consider what steps the U.S. will need to take to outstrip the
capabilities of Russia, China, Iran, North Korea, and other emerging hostile actors in the cyber
domain.
(U) U.S. cyber doctrine should serve as the basis for a discussion with U.S. allies
and others about new cyber norms. Just as the international community has established norms
and treaties about the use of technologies and weapons systems, the U.S. should lead a
conversation about cyber norms and the limits of cyber activity with allies and others.
'The Committee's recommendation to "reinforce states' primacy in running elections" should be understood in reference to states' responsibility for
election security, and not as pertaining to broader election issues, such as campaign finance laws or voting rights laws.'
(U) States Slow to Prepare for Hacking Threats, Eric Geller, Politico, July 18,2018.
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3. (U) Build a Stiuuger Defense, Part II: Improve Information Gathering and
Sharing on Threats
The U.S. government needs to build the cyber expertise and capacity of its
domestic agencies, such as DHS and FBI, and reevaluate the current authorities that
govern efforts to defend against foreign cyber threats. NSA and CIA collection is, by law,
directed outside the United States.
The U.S. government should invest in capabilities for rapid attribution of
cyber attacks, without sacrificing accurac:i
However, the IC needs to improve its ability to
provide timely and actionable warning. Timely and accurate attribution is not only important to
defensive information sharing, but will also underpin a credible deterrence and response strategy.
(U) The federal government and state governments need to create clear channels of
communication two ways—down from the federal government to the state and local level,
and up from the state and local officials on the front lines to federal entities. In 2016, DHS
and FBI did not provide enough information or context to election officials about the threat they
were facing, but states and DHS have made significant progress in this area in the last two years.
For example, Secretary of Homeland Security Nielsen testified to the Committee in March 2018
that "today I can say with confidence that we know whom to contact in every state to share threat
information. That capability did not exist in 2016."^^*^
(U) A key component of information sharing about elections is security clearances
for appropriate officials at the state and local level. DHS and its partners can effectively strip
classified information off of cyber indicators, which can then be passed to technical staff at the
state level, but in order for those indicators to not get lost in the multitude of cyber threats those
professionals see on a daily basis, senior officials at the state and local levels need to know the
(U) SSCl Transcript ofthe Open Hearing on Election Security, held on March 21,2018, p. 16.
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context surrounding the indicators. Stale officials need to know why a particular threat is of
significant concern, and should be prioritized. That context could come from classified
information, or states could come to understand that threat information DHS passes them is more
serious than that received through other sources. DHS's goal is to obtain clearances for up to
three officials per state."" Asof August 2018, DHS had provided a clearance to 92 officials"';
as of late 2017 all state election officials had received interim secret clearances or one-day read-
ins for secret-level briefings."- DHS, along with ODNI and FBI, also hosted state and local
election officials for a SECRET-level briefing on the sidelines of the biannual NASS and NASS-
ED conferences in Washington, DC in February 2018. In March, Amy Cohen, Executive
Director of NASS-ED testified in front of the Committee that, "It would be naive to say that we
received answers to all our questions, but the briefing was incredibly valuable and demonstrated
how seriously DHS and others take their commitment to the elections community as well as to
our concerns.""^ The Committee recommends DHS continue providing such briefings and
improve the quality of information shared.
(U) Fundamental to meaningful information sharing, however, is that state officials
understand what they are getting. New inductees to the world of classified information are often
disappointed—they expected to see everything laid out in black and white, when intelligence is
often very gray, with a pattern discemable only to those who know where to look and what
conclusions to draw. Those sharing the intelligence should manage expectations—at the
SECRET level, officials are likely to see limited context about conclusions, but not much more.
(U) Federal officials should work to declassify information, for the purpose of
providing warning to appropriate state and local officials, to the greatest extent possible. If
key pieces of context could be provided at a lower classification level while still protecting
classified information, DHS and its partners should strive to do so.
4. (U) Build a Stronger Defense, Part III: Secure Election-Related Cyber Systems
(U) Despite the expense, cybersecurity needs to become a higher priority for
election-related infrastructure. The Committee found a wide range of cybersecurity practices
across the states. Some states were highly focused on building a culture of cybersecurity; others
were severely under-resourced and relying on part-time help.
(U) The Committee recommends State officials work with DHS to evaluate the
security of their election systems end-to-end and prioritize implementing the following
steps to secure voter registration systems, state records, and other pre-election activities.
The Committee additionallv recommends that State officials:
(U) SSCl Transcript of the Open Hearing on Election Security, held on March 21,2018, p. 15.
(U) DTS 2018-3275, Summary of 8/22/2018 All Senators Election Security Briefing, August 28, 2018.
(U) SSCI Transcript of the Open Hearing on Election Security, held on March 21, 2018, p 15,26.
"^(U) SSCI Transcript of the Open Hearing on Election Security, held on March 21, 2018, p.l 13.
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•  (U) Idcntif)' the weak points in their networks, like under-resourced localities. State 7
said they are not worried about locations like larger counties when it comes to network
security, but they are worried about "the part-time registrar who is also the town attorney
and the town accountant and is working out of a 17'^ century jail."
•  (U) Undertake security audits of state and local voter registration systems, ideally
utilizing private sector entities capable of providing such assistance. State and local
officials should pay particular attention to the presence of high severity vulnerabilities in
relevant web applications, as well as highly exploitable vulnerabilities such as cross-site
scripting and SQL injection.
•  (U) Institute two-factor authentication for user access to state databases.
•  (U) Install monitoring sensors on state systems. As of mid-2018, DHS's ALBERT
sensors covered up to 98% of voting infrastructure nationwide, according to
Undersecretary Krebs.^^^
•  (U) Include voter registration database recovery in state continuity of operations plans.
•  (U) Update software in voter registration systems. One state mentioned that its voter
registration system is more than ten years old, and its employees will "start to look for
shortcuts" as it gets older and slower, further imperiling cybersecurity.
•  (U) Create backups, including paper copies, of state voter registration databases.
•  (U) Consider a voter education program to ensure voters check registration information
well prior to an election.
(U) DHS in the past year has stepped up its ability to assist the states with some of these
activities, but DHS needs to continue its focus on election infrastructure and pushing resources to
the states.
(U) The Committee recommends DHS take the following steps:
•  (U) Create an advisory panel to give DHS expert-level advice on how states and
localities run elections. The Government Coordinating Council, created as part of the
critical infrastructure designation, could serve as a venue for educating DHS on what
states do and what they need.
(U) Memorandum for the Record, SSCI Staff, Conference Call with [State 7], January 25,2018.
(U) DTS 2018-3275, Summary of 8/22/2018 All Senators Election Security Briefing, August 28,2018.
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•  (U) Create guidelines on cybersecurity best practices for elections and a public
awareness campaign to promote election security awareness, working through EAC,
NASS, and NASED, and with the advisory panel.
•  (U) Develop procedures and processes to evaluate and routinely provide guidance on
relevant vulnerabilities associated with voting systems in conjunction with election
experts.
•  (U) UHS has already created a catalog of services they can provide to states to help
secure states' systems. DHS should maintain the catalog and continue to update it as it
refines its understanding of what states need.
•  (U) Expand capacity so wait times for services, like voluntary vulnerability assessments,
are manageable and so that DHS can maintain coverage on other critical infrastructure
sectors. Robbing resources from other critical infrastructure sectors will eventually
create unacceptable new vulnerabilities.
•  (U) Work with GSA to establish a list of approved private-sector vendors who can
provide services similar to those DHS provides. States report being concerned about
"vultures" —companies who show up selling dubious cyber solutions. That being said,
some states will be more comfortable having a private sector entity evaluate their state
systems than a federal agency.
•  (U) Continue to build the resources of the newly established EI-ISAC. States have
already found this information sharing service useful, and it could serve as a
clearinghouse for urgent threat information. As of August 2018, the El-ISAC had over
1,000 members with participants in all 50 states.
•  (U) Continue training for state and local officials, like the table-top exercise conducted
in August of 2018 that brought together representatives from 44 states, localities, and the
federal government to work through an election security crisis. The complexity of the
scenario encouraged state and local officials to identify serious gaps in their preparations
for Election Day.
5. (U) Build a Stronger Defense, Part IV: Take Steps to Secure the Vote Itself
(U) Given Russian intentions to undermine the credibility of the election process,
states should take urgent steps to replace outdated and vulnerable voting systems. When
safeguarding the integrity of U.S. elections, all relevant elements of the government—including
at the federal, state, and local level—need to be forward looking and work to address
vulnerabilities before they are exploited.
(U) DTS 2018-3275, Summary of 8/22/2018 All Senators blection Security Briefing, August 28,2018.
(U) DHS, Press release: DHS Hosts National Exercise on Election Security, August ! 5,2018.
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(U) As states look to replace HAVA-era machines that are now out of date, they should
purchase more secure voting machines. Paper ballots and optical scanners are the least
vulnerable to cyber attack; at minimum, any machine purchased going forward should
have a voter-verified paper trail and remove (or render inert) any wireless networking
capability.
(U) States should require that machines purchased from this point forward are either
EAC certified or comply with the WSG standards. State purchasers should write
contracts with vendors to ensure adherence to the highest security standards and to
demand guarantees the supply chains for machines are secure.
(U) In concert with the need for paper ballots comes the need to secure the chain of
custody for those ballots. States should reexamine their safeguards against insertion of
fraudulent paper ballots at the local level, for example time stamping when ballots are
scanned.
(U) Statistically sound audits may be the simplest and most direct way to ensure
confidence in the integrity of the vote."^ States should begin to implement audits of
election results. Logic and accuracy tests of machines are a common step, but do not
speak to the integrity of the actual vote counting. Risk-limiting audits, or some similarly
rigorous altemative, are the future of ensuring that votes east are votes counted. State 8,
State 12, State 21, State 9, State 2, State 16, and others already audit their results, and
others are exploring additional pilot programs. However, as of August 2018, five
states conducted no post-election audit and 14 states do not do a complete post-election
audit.^^" The Committee recognizes states' concern about the potential cost of such
audits and the necessary changes to state laws and procedures; however, the Committee
believes the benefit of having a provably accurate vote is worth the cost.
(U) States should resist pushes for online voting. One main argument for voting online
is to allow members of the military easier access to their fundamental right to vote while
deployed. While the Committee agrees states should take great pains to ensure members
(U) Election experts point out, however, that audits could create a new vector for election-related lawsuits.
Complainants could allege that the audit was done improperly, or that the audit process reflected bias.
fU) State 8 passed a law to audit starting in 2018, with random precinct sampling. State 12 does state-wide
audits. State 21 audits 2% of ballots, randomly selected. State 9 picks 210 of 4 lOo precincts at random for an audit.
State 2 hand-counts ballots in randomly selected precincts and uses automated software to test. A States law on
ballot storage can't accommodate risk-limiting audits. Instead, they use ClearBallot software. They upload images
of ballots to an external hard drive and send it to ClearBallot. ClearBallot is blind to who won and independently
evaluates the results. In addition, the company can identify problems with scanners; for example, when a fold in
absentee ballots recorded as a vote. Cybersecurity experts still doubt, however, that this type of procedure is secure.
(U) DTS 2018-3275, Summary of 8/22/2018 All Senators Election Security Briefing, August 28, 2018.
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of the militai7 get to vote tor their elected olTicials, no system of online voting has yet
established itself as secure.
•  (U) DHS should work with vendors of election equipment to educate them about the
vulnerabilities in both the machines and the supply chains for the components of their
machines. Idaho National Lab is already doing some independent work on the security of
a select set of voting machines, developing a repeatabie methodology for independently
testing the security of such systems.
•  (U) The Department of State should work with FBI and DHS to warn states about
foreign efforts to access polling places outside normal channels in the future and remain
vigilant about rejecting aberrant attempts.
•  (U) The Associated Press is responsible for reporting unofficial, initial election results on
election night and is a critical part of public confidence in the voting tally. States and
DHS should work with the AP and other reporting entities to ensure they are both secure
and reporting accurate results.
•  (U) The Committee found that, often, election experts, national security experts, and
cybersecurity experts are speaking different languages. Election officials focus on
transparent processes and open access and are concerned about introducing uncertainty
into the system; national security professionals tend to see the threat first. Both sides
need to listen to each other better and to use more precise language.
6. (U) Assistance for the States
(U) State officials told the Committee the main obstacle to improving cybersecurity and
purchasing more secure voting machines is cost. State budgets are stretched thin by priorities
that seem more urgent on a daily basis and are far more visible to constituents.
(U) In March 2018, Congress appropriated $380 million in funds under the HAVA
formula for the states. As of August 2018, states had begun to allocate and spend that money for
items such as cybersecurity improvements.
(U) The Committee recommends the EAC, which administers the grants, regularly
report to Congress on how the states are using those funds, whether more funds are
needed, and whether states have both replaced outdated voting equipment and improved
(U) Dr. Halderman in his testimony before the Committee said, "I think that online voting, unfortunately, would
be painting a bullseye on our election system. Today's technology just does not provide the level of security
assurance for an online election that you would need in order for voters to have high confidence. And I say that
having myself... hacked an online voting system that was about to be used in real elections, having found
vulnerabilities in online voting systems that are used in other countries. The technology Just isn't ready for use." See
SSCI Transcript ofthe Open Hearing on Russian Interference in the 2016 U.S. Elections, held on Wednesday, June
21,2017, p. 152.
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cybersecuritj. Muie funds may be needed, as the allocation under the HAVA formula did
not prioritize replacing vulnerable electronic-only machines.
•  (U) States should be able to use grant funds to improve cybersecurity in a variety of
ways, including hiring additional IT staff, updating software, and contracting with
vendors to provide cybersecurity services. "Security training ftmded and provided by a
f "382
an
ederal entity such as the EAC or DHS would also be beneficial in our view,
official from Illinois testified.
(U) Funds should also be available to defray the cost of instituting audits.
(U) States with vulnerable DRE machines with no paper backup should receive urgent
access to funding. Dr. Halderman testified that replacing insecure paperless voting
machines nationwide would cost $130 to $400 million dollars. Risk-limiting audits
would cost less than S20 million a year.^^^
Build a Credible
(U) ssci Transcript of the Open Hearing on Russian Interference in the 2016 U.S. Elections, held on
Wednesday, June 21,2017, p. 114.
383{\})lbid., p. 119.
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MINORITY VIEWS OF SENATOR WYDEN
(U) The role of the federal government
(U) The Committee report deseribes Russian attacks on U.S. election infrastructure in 2016 and
lays out many of the serious vulnerabilities that exist to this day. These vulnerabilities pose a
direct and urgent threat to American democracy which demands immediate congressional action.
The defense of U.S. national security against a highly sophisticated foreign government cannot
be left to state and covmty officials. For that reason, I cannot support a report whose top
recommendation is to "reinforee[ ] state's primacy in running elections."
(U) Congress's constitutional role in regulating federal elections is well-established. In response
to an inquiry from the bipartisan leadership of the U.S. Senate, the General Aecormting Office
(GAG) wrote that "[w]ith regard to the administration of federal elections. Congress has
constitutional authority over both congressional and presidential elections."^ Indeed, pursuant to
the Elections Clause of the U.S. Constitution,^ Congress's authority over congressional elections
is "paramount to that of the states." As the GAG report details. Congress has repeatedly passed
legislation related to the administration of elections on topics such as the timing of federd
elections, voter registration, absentee voting requirements, disability access, and voting rights.
(U) If there was ever a moment when Congress needed to exercise its clear constitutional
authorities to regulate elections, this is it. America is facing a direct assault on the heart of our
democracy by a determined adversary. We would not ask a local sheriff to go to war against the
missiles, planes and tanks of the Russian Army. We shouldn't ask a county election IT
employee to fight a war against the full capabilities and vast resources of Russia's cyber army.
That approach failed in 2016 and it will fail again. The federal government's response to this
ongoing crisis cannot be limited offers to provide resources and information, the aeeeptance of
which is voluntary. If the country's elections are to be defended. Congress must also establish
mandatory, nation-wide eyberseeurity requirements.
(U) Security of voting machines
(U) Experts are clear about the measures necessary to protect U.S. elections from cyber
manipulation.^ Absent an accessibility need, most voters should hand-mark paper ballots. For
voters with some kind of need, ballot marking devices that print paper ballots should be
available. Risk-limiting audits must be also be required. Currently, however, only Virginia,
Colorado and Rhode Island meet these requirements."^ These critical reforms must be adopted
' "Elections. The Scope of Congressional Authority in Election Administration," General Accounting Office, March
2001, prepared in response to a joint inquiry from Senator Trent Lott, Republican Leader; Senator Tom Daschle,
Democratic Leader; Senator Mitch McConnell, Chairman, and Senator Christopher Dodd, Ranking Member, of the
Senate Committee on Rules and Administration.
^ Article I, Section 4, Clause 1
^ Securing the Vote; Protecting American Democracy; National Academy of Sciences, Engineering and Medicine,
September 2018
National Conference of State Legislatures, Post-Election Audits, January 3,2019. Verifiedvoter.org. The Verifier -
Polling Place Equipment - November 2018. Oregon requires paper ballots and the Oregon State Senate has passed a
bill requiring risk-limiting audits.
throughout the country, which is why, on June 27, 2019, the House of Representatives passed
H.R 2722, the Securing America's Federal Elections (SAFE) Act. The security of the country's
voting machines depends on this legislation being signed into law.
(U) The Committee, in recommending basic security measures like paper ballots and audits,
notes that there is currently "a wide range of cybersecurity practices across the states." Indeed,
the data is deeply concerning and highlights the need for mandatory, nation-wide standards. For
example, the Committee rightly highlights the vulnerabilities of Direct-Recording Electronic
(DRE) Voting Machines, noting that, without a paper trail, there would be no way to conduct a
meaningful "recount" and compromises would remain undetected. As of November 2018,
however, there were still four states in which every single county relied on DREs without voter
verified paper audit trail printers (VVPAT) and, in an additional eight states, there were multiple
counties that relied on DREs without a VVPAT.^ Gaps in the deployment of VVPATs, which
are far less secure than hand-marked paper ballots, demonstrate that even bare minimum security
best practices are not being met in many parts of the country.
(U) In addition, 16 slates have no post-election audits of any kind, while many others have
insufficient or perfunctory audits. Only four states have a statutory requirement for risk-limiting
audits, while two states provide options for counties to run different kinds of audits, one of which
is a risk-limiting audit.^ Next year, a third state will provide that option. In other words, the vast
majority of states have made no moves whatsoever toward implementing minimum standards
that experts agree are necessary to guarantee the integrity of elections.
(U) The Committee rightly identifies problems with vendors of voting machines, noting
vulnerabilities in both the machines and the supply chains for machine components. Currently,
however, the federal government has no regulatory authority that would require these vendors to
adhere to basic security practices.^ Only general federal requirements that states and localities
use paper ballots and conduct audits will ensure that the risk posed by voting machines provided
by private vendors to states and localities can be contained. The stakes could not be more clear.
As Homeland Secretary Kirstjen Nielsen testified to the Committee, "If there is no way to audit
the election, that is absolutely a national security concem." ®
(U) Registration databases and election night reporting websites
(U) Two additional components of the U.S. election infrastructure require immediate,
mandatory cybersecurity fixes. The first are voter registration databases. The Committee
received testimony about successful Russian exfiltration of databases of tens of thousands of
voters.^ Expert witnesses also described the chaos that manipulated voter registration data could
cause should voters arrive at the polls and find that their names had been removed from the rolls.
^ Verifiedvoter.org. The Verifier - Polling Place Equipment - November 2018.
^ The four states are Colorado, Nevada, Rhode Island, and Virginia. National Conference of State Legislatures,
Post-Election Audits, January 3, 2019.
' Testimony of Homeland Security Secretary Kirstjen Nielsen, March 21, 2018.
® Testimony of Homeland Security Secretary Kirstjen Nielsen, March 21, 2018.
^ Testimony of Connie Lawson, President-elect, National Association of Secretaries of State, and Secretary of State,
State of Indiana; testimony of Steve Sandvoss, Executive Director of Illinois State Board of Elections, June 21,
2017; Illinois Voter Registration System Database Breach Report.
As one expert testified, this form of interference "could be used to sabotage the election process
on Rlection Day."'®
(U) The Committee report describes a range of cybersecurity measures needed to protect voter
registration databases, yet there are currently no mandatory rules that require states to implement
even minimum cybersecurity measures. There are not even any voluntary federal standards.
(U) An additional component of the U.S. election infrastructure that requires immediate,
mandatory cybersecurity measures are the election night reporting websites run by the states.
I'he Committee heard testimony about a Russian attack on Ukraine's web page for announcing
results. That attacked allowed the Russians to use misinformation that left Ukraine in chaos for
days after the election. As the Committee's expert witness warned, "[w]e need to look at that
playbook. They will do it to us."'' Like voter registration databases, election results websites
are not subject to any mandatory standards. Both of these critical vulnerabilities, as well as
vulnerabilities of voting machines, must be addressed by the U.S. Congress through the passage
of S. 2238, the Senate version of the SAFE Act.
(U) Given the inconsistent, and at times non-existent adherence to basic cybersecurity among
states and localities, I cannot agree with the Committee's conclusion that "the country's
decentralized election system can be a strength from a cybersecurity perspective." Until election
security measures are required of every state and locality, there will be vulnerabilities to be
exploited by our adversaries. The persistence of those vulnerabilities has national consequences.
The manipulation of votes or voter registration databases in any county in the country can
change the result of a national election. The security of the U.S. election system thus hinges on
its weakest links - the least capable, least resourced local election offices in the country, many of
which do not have a single full-time employee focused on cybersecurity.
(U) Every American has a direct stake in the cybersecurity of elections throughout the country.
Congress has an obligation to protect the country's election system everywhere. If there were
gaps in the defense of our coastline or air space, members would ensure that the federal
government close them. Vulnerabilities in the country's election cybersecurity require the same
level of national commitment.
(U) Cybersecurity vulnerabilities and influence campaigns
(U) The cybersecurity vulnerabilities of the U.S. election system cannot be separated from
Russia's efforts to influence American voters. As the January 2017 Intelligence Community
Assessment (ICA) concluded, and as the Committee report notes, the Russians were "prepared to
publicly call into question the validity of the results" and "pro-Kremlin bloggers had prepared a
Twitter campaign, #DemocracyRIP, on election night in anticipation of Secretary Clinton's
victory." This plan highlights an additional reason why nation-wide election cybersecurity
standards are so critical. If Russia's preferred candidate does not prevail in the 2020 election, the
Testimony of Alex J. Halderman, Professor of Computer Science and Engineering, University of Michigan, June
21,2017.
" Testimony of Eric Rosenbach, Co-Director of the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard
Kennedy School, March 21,2018.
Russians may seek to delegitimize the election. The absence of any successful cyber intrusions,
exfiltrations or manipulations would greatly benefit the U.S. public in resisting such a campaign.
(U) While not formally part of the U.S. election infrastructure, the devices and accounts of
candidates and political parties represent an alarming vulnerability in the country's overall
election system. Russia's campaign of hacking the emails of prominent political figures and
releasing them through Wikileaks, Gucifer 2.0, and DCLeaks was probably its most effective
means of influencing the 2016 election. The Committee has received extensive testimony about
these operations, the vulnerabilities that allowed them to occur, and the threat those
vulnerabilities pose to the integrity of American democracy.'^ Yet little has been done to prevent
it from happening all over again. S. 1569, the Federal Campaign Cybersecurity Assistance Act
of 2019, addresses these vulnerabilities head on by authorizing political committees to provide
cybersecurity assistance to candidates, campaigns and state parties.
(U) These vulnerabilities extend to the U.S. Senate, most of whose members are or will be
candidates for reelection or for other positions. As a November 2018 Senate report noted, there
is "mounting evidence that Senators are being targeted for hacking, which could include
exposure of personal data."'^ Private communications and information reside on personal
accounts and devices. Passage of S. 890, the Senate Cybersecurity Protection Act, will authorize
the Senate Sergeant at Arms to protect the personal devices and accounts of Senators and their
staff and help prevent the weaponization of their data in campaigns to influence elections.
(U) Assessments related to the 2016 election
(U) I have also submitted these Minority Views to address assessments related to Russian
activities during the 2016 election. According to the January 2017 ICA, DHS assessed that "the
types of systems we observed Russian actors targeting or compromising are not involved in vote
tallying." An assessment based on observations is only as good as those observations and this
assessment, in which DHS had only moderate confidence,^'* suffered from a lack of observable
data. As Acting Deputy Undersecretary of Homeland Security for National Protection and
Programs Directorate, Jeannette Manfra, testified at the Committee's June 21, 2017, hearing,
DHS did not conduct any forensic analysis of voting machines.
(U) DHS's prepared testimony at that hearing included the statement that it is "likely that cyber
manipulation of U.S. election systems intended to change the outcome of a national election
would be detected." The language of this assessment raises questions, however, about DHS's
ability to identify cyber manipulation that could have affected a very close national election,
particularly given DHS's acknowledgment of the "possibility that individual or isolated cyber
See, for example, Committee hearing, March 30, 2017.
Senators' Personal Cybersecurity Working Group Report, submitted by the Senators' Personal Cybersecurity
Working Group, November 2018.
Responses to Questions for the Record from Dr. Samuel Liles, Acting Director of Cyber Division, Office of
Intelligence and Analysis; and Jeanette Manfra, Acting Deputy Undersecretary, National Protection and Programs
Directorate, following Committee hearing, June 21,2017.
intrusions into U.S. election infrastructure could go undetected, especially at local levels."'^
Moreover, DHS has acknowledged that its assessment with regard to the detection of outcome-
changing cyber manipulation did not apply to state-wide or local elections.'^
(U) Assessments about manipulations of voter registration databases are equally hampered by
the absence of data. As the Committee acknowledges, it "has limited information on the extent
to which state and local election authorities carried out forensic evaluation of registration
databases." Assessments about Russian attacks on the administration of elections are also
complicated by newly public information about the infiltration of an election technology
company. Moreover, as the Special Counsel reported, the GRU sent spear phishing emails to
"Florida county officials responsible for administering the 2016 election" which "enabled the
GRU to gain access to the network of at least one Florida county government."'^
(U) The Committee, in stating that it had found no evidence that vote tallies were altered or that
voter registry files were deleted or modified, rightly noted that the Committee's and the IC's
insight into this aspect of the 2016 election was limited. I believe that the lack of relevant data
precludes attributing any significant weight to the Committee's finding in this area.
(U) The Committee's investigation into other aspects of Russia's interference in the 2016
election will be included in subsequent chapters. I look forward to reviewing those chapters and
hope that outstanding concerns about members' Committee staff access to investigative material,
including non-compartmented and unclassified information, will be resolved.
Responses to Questions for the Record from Dr. Samuel Liles, Acting Director of Cyber Division, Office of
Intelligence and Analysis; and Jeanette Manfra, Acting Deputy Undersecretary, National Protection and Programs
Directorate, following.Committee hearing, June 21, 2017.
Responses to Questions for the Record from Dr. Samuel Liles, Acting Director of Cyber Division, Office of
Intelligence and Analysis; and Jeanette Manfra, Acting Deputy Undersecretary, National Protection and Programs
Directorate, following.Committee hearing, June 21, 2017.
Report on the Investigation Into Russian Interference In The 2016 Presidential Election, Special Counsel Robert
S. Mueller III, March 2019
ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF SENATORS HARRIS, BENNET, AND HEINRICH
(U) The Russian government's attack on the 2016 election was the product of a
deliberate, sustained, and sophisticated campaign to undermine American democracy. Russian
military intelligence carried out a hacking operation targeting American political figures and
institutions. The Internet Research Agency—an entity with ties to Russian President Vladimir
Putin—^used social media to sow disinformation and discord among the American electorate,
And, as this report makes clear, individuals affiliated with the Russian government launched
cyber operations that attempted to access our nation's election infrastructure, in some cases
succeedhig.
(U) The Russian objectives were clear: deepen distrust in our political leaders; exploit
and widen divisions within American society; undermine confidence in the integrity of our
elections; and, ultimately, weaken America's democratic institutions and damage our nation's
standing in the world. The Committee did not discover evidence that Russia changed or
manipulated vote tallies or voter registration information, however Russian operatives
undoubtedly gained familiarity with our election systems and voter registration infrastructure—
valuable intelligence that it may seek to exploit in the future.
(U) The Committee's report does not merely document the wide reach of the Russian
operation; the report reveals vulnerabilities in our election infrastructure that we must
collectively address. We do not endorse every recommendation in the Committee's report, and
we share some of our colleagues' concems about the vulnerability that we face, particularly at
the state level, where counties with limited resources must defend themselves against
sophisticated nation-state adversaries. Nevertheless, the report as a whole makes an important
contribution to the public's understanding of how Russia interfered in 2016, and underscores the
importance of working together to defend against the threat going forward.
(U) It is critical that state and local policymakers study the report's findings and work to
secure election systems by prioritizing cybersecurity, replacing outdated systems and machines,
and implementing audits to identify and limit risk. The Intelligence Community and other federal
agencies must improve efforts to detect cyberattacks, enhance coordination wi& state and local
officials, and develop strategies to mitigate threats. And, critically. Congress must take up and
pass legislation to secure our elections. We must provide states the funding necessary to
modernize and maintain election infrastructure, and we must take commonsense steps to
safeguard the integrity of the vote, such as requiring paper ballots in all federal elections.
(U) Our adversaries will persist in their efforts to undermine our shared democratic
values. In order to ensure that our democracy endures, it is imperative that we recognize the
threat and make the investments necessary to withstand the next attack.
